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THE DECLINE AND (POSSIBLE) RENEWAL OF 
ASPIRATION IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
Robert W. Adler* 
Abstract: In the approximately four decades since Congress adopted sweeping 
amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act—creating what is commonly known 
as the Clean Water Act (CWA)—the United States has made significant progress in reducing 
many kinds of water pollution. It is clear, however, that the United States has not attained the 
most ambitious of the statutory goals and objectives, including the overarching objective to 
“restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
waters.”1 Indeed, although discrete water quality improvements continue in some places and 
for some forms of pollution, on a national scale progress toward the CWA’s goals has stalled 
in the past two decades. This Article explores several possible reasons for that failure. Those 
reasons include subversion of the statutory goals at the administrative, judicial, and 
legislative levels due to an imbalance in power between groups interested in how the law is 
implemented; the degree to which the statutory goals are perceived as unrealistic by those 
charged with implementation; and the potential that Congress intended those ambitious goals 
to serve as prods for as much progress as possible, but did not actually expect them to be 
achieved. The Article then proposes that significantly more progress can be made if we take 
advantage of available means of defining the ecological integrity of aquatic ecosystems more 
clearly and more precisely, using as examples biological water quality criteria, functional 
assessment methods for wetlands restoration and protection, and the use of real-world desired 
future condition definitions for watersheds. Better definition of what the somewhat imprecise 
statutory goals mean in the real world might help to overcome the apparent belief that those 
goals are impossible or infeasible to attain. 
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“It’s not enough that we do our best; 




The federal Clean Water Act (CWA)3 is a mammoth of a statute.4 
Over the course of its long history,5 the CWA has spawned an equally 
2. Jennifer Rosenberg, Churchill Quotes: A Collection of Quotes by Winston Churchill, 
ABOUT.COM (July 21, 2013), http://www.history1900s.about.com/od/people/a/ChurchillQuotes.htm.  
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387. Congress first passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 
750, Pub. L. No. 80-85, 62 Stat. 1155, in 1948 and amended it several times before passing the 
version now known by its short name, “Clean Water Act.” See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.1.A.4.a (2d ed. 1994).  
4. The Act, as amended, consumes 180 pages in the U.S. Code. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387. These 
provisions appear at pages 797–977 of the published Code.  
5. This Article was inspired by the fortieth anniversary of what most CWA observers view as 
adoption of the “modern” version of the statute in October 1972. See Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816.  
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impressive battery of implementing regulations6 and guidance 
documents,7 and a huge body of case law interpreting and enforcing the 
statute.8 
This massive level of statutory and regulatory detail is explained, 
perhaps, by the reality that water pollution control is a very complex 
undertaking. Hundreds of thousands of municipal and industrial “point 
source[s]”9 discharge a diverse array of “pollutant[s]”10 into the 
“navigable waters.”11 An even larger set of human activities known 
somewhat inelegantly as “nonpoint sources”12—indeed virtually every 
human use of land—contributes further to the impairment of the rivers, 
lakes, and coastal waters that Congress enacted the CWA to protect. 
Efforts to control each of those pollution sources involve technical, 
economic, political, and other complexities. The intricate, layered set of 
principles Congress adopted to distinguish fairly among those sources 
while still providing sufficient control to protect human health and 
welfare and the quality of aquatic environments reflect those 
complications. 
At times, however, this degree of complexity obscures the relatively 
straightforward—although admittedly ambitious—overarching objective 
of the CWA to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”13 Thus, while many scholars 
and practitioners (including me, in both capacities) have written a 
tremendous body of doctrinal commentary on virtually all aspects of the 
CWA’s implementation, and offered many specific proposals for 
6. See 40 C.F.R. pts. 104–503 (2012).  
7. For links to a lengthy set of CWA guidance documents, see Water: Policy & Guidance, EPA, 
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/index.cfm (last visited Aug. 3, 2013).  
8. Federal case annotations alone consume more than 750 pages of the U.S. Code Annotated. See 
33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251–1387 (West 2013).  
9. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (defining a point source as “any discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged”). According to EPA, as of 2001 
over 400,000 point source dischargers required permits under the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES). EPA, PROTECTING THE NATION’S WATERS THROUGH EFFECTIVE 
NPDES PERMITS, A STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2001 AND BEYOND 1 (2001), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/strategicplan.pdf.  
10. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (defining a large range of materials as “pollutant[s]” covered by the 
CWA regulatory scheme).  
11. See id. § 1362(7) (defining “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States” for 
purposes of the statute’s geographic reach).  
12. Because the Act does not define “nonpoint sources” separately, by negative implication a 
nonpoint source is any source of “pollution” other than a point source. 
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(1). As detailed below, this principal objective is accompanied by a series of 
subsidiary congressional goals and policies. See id. § 1251(a)(1)–(7).  
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improvement,14 my purpose in this essay honoring the fortieth 
anniversary of the pivotal 1972 CWA amendments is far more basic, but 
hopefully equally important. 
Most analysis of CWA implementation suggests that there has been 
significant progress in implementing many of the statute’s discrete 
technical commands, although other parts of the law have been far less 
effective. Despite this progress, however, it is equally apparent that the 
principle aspirations of the statute remain unfulfilled. I explore two main 
questions in this Article: (1) why do the CWA’s principal aspirations 
remain unmet?; and (2) what can be done to restore the spirit of 
aspiration that Congress embedded in the statute in 1972? 
Part I of this essay will identify the attributes of the CWA that 
characterize it as a highly aspirational statute. Part II will demonstrate 
briefly that those aspirations have not been met, despite four solid 
decades of dedicated effort and commitment by federal, state, and local 
governments as well as the private sector, not to mention billions of 
dollars in public and private investment in water pollution control. Part 
III will posit three theories to explain why the law’s major aspirations 
have not been fulfilled, and attempt to explain the Act’s failures by 
reference to each of those theories. Part IV will suggest a new 
perspective on how to convert the philosophy of aspiration in the CWA 
to reality, supported by several brief examples of existing, uncelebrated 
programs that illustrate the concept. Part V will conclude that the key to 
restoring aspiration to the CWA—and to restoring the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters—may be to 
focus on affirmative definitions of the future condition of aquatic 
ecosystems instead of simply implementing a series of negative 
prohibitions. 
14. For just a small sampling of this huge body of scholarship, and with due apologies to virtually 
all of the authors who necessarily must be omitted, see Michael C. Blumm & William Warnock, 
Roads Not Taken: EPA vs. Clean Water, 33 ENVTL. L. 79 (2003); Jamison E. Colburn, Waters of the 
United States: Theory, Practice, and Integrity at the Supreme Court, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 183 
(2007); David Drelich, Restoring the Cornerstone of the Clean Water Act, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
267 (2009); Victor B. Flatt, Spare the Rod and Spoil the Law: Why the Clean Water Act Has Never 
Grown Up, 55 ALA. L. REV. 595 (2004); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General 
Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409 (2007); Robert L. Glicksman & 
Mathew R. Batzel, Science, Politics, Law, and the Arc of the Clean Water Act: The Role of 
Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution Control Landmark, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99 
(2010); Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More Than Five-and-a-Half Decades of Federal 
Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
527 (2005); Mark C. Van Putten & Bradley D. Jackson, The Dilution of the Clean Water Act, 19 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 863 (1986).  
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I. THE CLEAN WATER ACT IS AN ASPIRATIONAL STATUTE 
What do I mean by “aspirational”? To some extent, all statutes (or 
more precisely, those who propose and adopt them) are aspirational in 
that they propose to achieve specific goals, for example, to punish or to 
deter individual acts of homicide. An aspirational national homicide 
statute, however, might set a goal of “a murder-free America by 2050” 
rather than simply criminalizing specific actions. 
A. Chemical, Physical, and Biological Integrity 
In this sense, the CWA is manifestly an aspirational statute, as 
reflected most notably in the opening words of section 101.15 Rather 
than simply prohibiting specific actions that cause water pollution, 
Congress established an ambition-affirmative goal: “The objective of 
this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”16 
The degree of ambition reflected in this aspiration depends on the 
meaning of the word “integrity,” which I have discussed in an earlier 
work.17 Briefly, Congress made clear in the legislative history of the 
1972 amendments, in which this language was adopted, that “chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity” means something approximating 
natural aquatic ecosystem structure and function. The 1971 Senate 
Report, for example, indicated that integrity “requires that any 
changes . . . in a pristine water body be of a temporary nature, such that 
by natural processes, within a few hours, days or weeks, the aquatic 
ecosystem will return to a state functionally identical to the original.”18 
Similarly, the 1972 House Report explained that integrity “refers to a 
condition in which the natural structure and function of ecosystems is 
maintained.”19 
Congress reinforced the opening objective of the CWA in the 
statutory definition of “pollution” as “the man-made or man-induced 
alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity 
of water.”20 Notably, that definition of pollution encompasses a far 
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1251.  
16. Id. § 1251(a).  
17. See Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive 
Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity, 33 ENVTL. L. 29, 44–46 (2003).  
18. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 76 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742. 
19. H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 76 (1972).  
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19).  
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broader range of human activities that might impair aquatic ecosystem 
integrity than direct discharges of pollutants.21 The statutory definition 
of pollution logically includes, for example, dams that alter the flow 
regime and physical structure of water bodies; water withdrawals that 
change a river’s hydrology, habitat, and temperature regime; levees or 
other flood control structures that modify stream bank morphology, 
adjacent wetlands, floodplain, and other riparian habitat; and every land 
use that causes erosion and sedimentation and changes to storm water 
discharge rate and timing. To pursue the analogy to a hypothetical 
aspirational national homicide statute, Congress might add, in addition 
to direct prohibitions on intentional killing, a definition of “unnatural 
deaths.” That definition might include every situation in which people 
die from preventable causes, and an accompanying aspirational goal that 
all such deaths be avoided. 
B. Subsidiary Goals and Policies 
To “achieve” the overarching statutory objective of chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity, Congress added a series of subsidiary 
goals and policies.22 There is no clear indication in the legislative history 
whether Congress intended to distinguish sharply between the 
“objective” in the opening sentence of the CWA and the “goals” 
established in subsections 101(a)(1) and (2) versus the “policies” 
expressed in subsections 101(a)(3)–(7). Typically, courts assume that the 
legislature chooses different words intentionally, to indicate different 
meanings.23 The statutory “objective” appears to reflect the underlying 
intended end result of the statutory scheme, and the sentence that follows 
the objective makes clear that the ensuing goals and objectives are 
designed as means to that end: “In order to achieve this objective it is 
hereby declared that, consistent with the provisions of this chapter—
 . . . .”24 Moreover, the two “goals” provisions have an associated 
temporal deadline,25 while the “policy” statements do not,26 implying a 
specific intended result for the former and a more general intent as to 
methods for the latter. 
21. See id. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12) (prohibiting the discharge of any pollutant by any person). 
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)–(7).  
23. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995) (“We assume that Congress used two 
terms because it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”). 
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).  
25. Id. § 1251(a)(1)–(2). 
26. Id. § 1251(a)(3)–(7).  
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1. The Zero-Discharge Goal 
The first in the series of goals and policies, commonly referred to as 
the “zero-discharge goal,” provides: “[i]t is the national goal that the 
discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 
1985.”27 Again returning to the hypothetical homicide statute, the 
analogy would be a congressional pronouncement in 1972 that all 
intentional acts leading to the death of a human being, whether or not the 
actor intended a fatal result, be eliminated by 1985. 
The ambitious and aspirational nature of this goal is underscored by 
several factors. Congress defined the term “pollutant” broadly,28 giving 
the national discharge elimination goal a very broad sweep. The term 
“navigable waters”29 also reflects a broad sweep, although the Supreme 
Court has narrowed the statute’s geographic jurisdiction through a series 
of recent decisions.30 Note, however, that Congress never actually 
envisioned that the so-called “zero-discharge” goal would result in the 
complete elimination of pollutants reaching the nation’s waters, 
notwithstanding its simultaneous creation of the “National pollutant 
discharge elimination system” in section 402 of the CWA.31 The 
statutory goal is “that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable 
waters be eliminated by 1985.”32 The italicized phrase, however, is 
defined as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any 
point source,”33 meaning that nonpoint source discharges of 
pollutants34—as well as other forms of water pollution35—were not 
included in the zero-discharge aspiration. 
In historical context, the zero-discharge goal must be viewed in light 
of the fact that, in 1972, a combination of municipal and industrial 
dischargers were dumping large amounts of pollutants into the nation’s 
27. Id. § 1251(a)(1).  
28. Id. § 1362(6).  
29. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
30. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).  
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.  
32. Id. § 1251(a)(1) (emphasis added).  
33. Id. § 1362(12) (emphasis added).  
34. The statutory definition of “discharge,” unadorned by the qualifier “of pollutants,” is broader 
than “discharge of pollutants” because it includes, but is not limited to, a “discharge of pollutants.” 
Id. § 1362(16); see S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370 (2006).  
35. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (defining “pollution” as “the man-made or man-induced 
alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water”), with id. 
§ 1362(12) (defining the narrower concept of “discharge of pollutants”).  
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waters annually, yet Congress demanded that those discharges cease 
entirely in a scant thirteen years.36 Despite significant progress toward 
reducing pollutant discharges over the past four decades, however, it is 
notable that we remain a long way from achieving the goal several 
decades after the deadline for the initial goal passed.37 
2. The Fishable and Swimmable Goal 
The second subsidiary goal of the CWA, commonly referred to as the 
“fishable and swimmable” goal, provides that “wherever attainable, an 
interim goal of water quality which provides for the protection and 
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in 
and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983.”38 This goal, which 
focuses on the desired condition of the water body rather than the actions 
of individual dischargers, is nevertheless similarly aspirational in that it 
articulates a long-term goal rather than simply prescribing or proscribing 
particular actions or conduct. A reasonable analogy in the hypothetical 
national homicide statute would be a goal of “safe communities by 
1983,” meaning that people should feel comfortable walking the streets 
of their communities with a reasonable expectation that violent crime is 
not likely, even if the risk of violence is not zero. 
Despite being aspirational in nature, however, the fishable and 
swimmable goal seems inherently less ambitious than the zero-discharge 
goal. The fishable and swimmable goal is tempered by the phrase 
“wherever attainable,” which, although construed narrowly by EPA,39 
allows some room for exception based on circumstances and therefore is 
less absolutist than the zero-discharge goal. The meaning of “wherever 
attainable . . . by July 1, 1983,” however, is not entirely clear in the 
context of the full provision. One possible meaning, which EPA appears 
to have adopted by regulation, is that fishable and swimmable waters 
should be achieved by 1983 wherever attainable, meaning in those water 
bodies in which those goals are possible.40 An equally plausible reading 
of the text is that Congress intended water bodies to be made fishable 
and swimmable, wherever attainable by 1983. This latter interpretation 
would allow for some flexibility in the date, but not the ultimate fact, of 
36. Id. § 1251(a)(1) (adopted in October 1972 and requiring the complete elimination of the 
discharge of pollutants nationwide by 1985).  
37. See infra Part III.A.  
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).  
39. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(g) (2012).  
40. See id. § 131.2.  
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attainment of the fishable and swimmable goal.41 
Some believe that the CWA aspiration that all pollutant discharges 
must be eliminated entirely is extreme, but that the notion that waters 
should be unpolluted enough to support resident populations of fish and 
wildlife and clean enough to swim in is eminently reasonable.42 Indeed, 
at the time Congress was deliberating the 1972 Amendments, the 
National Water Commission favored this water quality-based approach, 
believing the zero-discharge goal to be unpractical, unnecessary, and 
economically unwise.43 On the other hand, the deadline for achieving the 
fishable and swimmable goal turned out to be unrealistic, at least as the 
CWA was actually implemented. Congress allowed only a decade to 
move from rivers catching on fire to rivers that were “fishable and 
swimmable.”44 Four decades later, a significant percentage of the 
nation’s waters have not yet attained that status.45 
3. No Toxics in Toxic Amounts 
The third subsidiary statutory aspiration, this one in the form of a 
congressional “policy” statement,46 is “the national policy that the 
discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts be prohibited.”47 As with 
the phrase chemical, physical, and biological integrity,” the degree of 
aspiration reflected in this policy depends on definition. What are “toxic 
pollutants” and what is a “toxic amount”? The sixteenth century 
physician Paracelsus, often identified as the father of toxicology,48 
famously noted: “Solely the dose determines that a thing is not a 
poison.”49 Any substance can be toxic in sufficient amounts, and 
although a sixteenth century physician lacked the tools necessary to 
41. Although no court appears to have had the opportunity to pass on these competing 
interpretations, presumably the result would depend on whether a court found the meaning of the 
provision clear under step I of the Chevron test, or ambiguous under Chevron step II. See Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
42. See infra Part III.B.2.  
43. See infra notes 218–20 and accompanying text.  
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (2006) (establishing July 1, 1983 deadline in the statute adopted in 
October 1972).  
45. See infra Part III.A.2.  
46. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text regarding the distinction between 
congressional goals and policies in the CWA.  
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3).  
48. See Joseph F. Borzelleca, Paracelsus: Herald of Modern Toxicology, 53 TOXICOLOGICAL 
SCI. 2, 2 (2000).  
49. Id. at 3. I thank my former colleague Diane Cameron for bringing this quote to my attention 
many years ago. 
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understand the concept of non-threshold toxins,50 even the most lethal 
substance does not necessarily cause harm in sufficiently low doses. 
The term “toxic pollutant” is defined in the CWA,51 and in the 1977 
amendments to the CWA Congress later enumerated more specifically 
which pollutants were considered toxic for purposes of the Act.52 What 
constitutes a “toxic amount,” however, remains the subject of the 
difficult and controversial science and policy of risk assessment.53 Thus, 
the degree of aspiration reflected in the “no toxics in toxic amounts” 
policy depends on agency scientific and value judgments regarding what 
is toxic. 
On its face, the “no toxics in toxic amounts” policy in section 
101(a)(3)54 also seems inconsistent with the zero-discharge goal 
established in section 101(a)(1).55 To be attained, the “zero-discharge 
goal” requires that all pollutant discharges be eliminated entirely. 
Fulfillment of the “no toxics in toxic amounts” policy, by contrast, 
requires only prohibition of the discharge of certain pollutants in certain 
amounts. How can the two apparently inconsistent provisions, both of 
which were in the original Senate bill leading to the 1972 Act,56 be 
reconciled? 
One possible explanation is that Congress adopted the zero-discharge 
goal as a statutory goal with an associated 1985 deadline, whereas “no 
toxics in toxic amounts” is a policy with no associated deadline. The 
most logical way to reconcile those otherwise inconsistent concepts is 
that Congress intended EPA to implement the no-toxics policy much 
more quickly, as an intermediate step to effectuating both the 1983 
“fishable and swimmable” goal and the 1985 “zero-discharge” goal. Of 
course, none of the three have been implemented fully as of 2013.57 
Nevertheless, the view of the policy articulated in section 101(a)(3) as a 
means of implementing the first two statutory goals is consistent with 
the fact that the four ensuing congressional “policy” statements similarly 
50. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) 
(describing non-threshold pollutants).  
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13).  
52. Id. § 1317(a).  
53. See, e.g., Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk Assessment, 19 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409 (1995); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk 
Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995).  
54. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3).  
55. Id. § 1251(a)(1).  
56. See S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 2 (1972) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 
3777. The House bill also included the zero-discharge provision. See id.  
57. See infra Part III.  
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outline means to the statutory ends.58 
C. Aspiration Versus Operation in the Clean Water Act 
Viewed from the above perspective, there is a logical hierarchy to the 
objective, goals, and policies Congress included in section 101(a) of the 
CWA. The first sentence of the statute contains Congress’s ultimate 
objective, to restore and maintain the structure and function of the 
nation’s waters and their associated aquatic ecosystems as measured by 
“chemical, physical, and biological integrity.” Congress then articulated 
a series of “goals” and “policies” “[i]n order to achieve” that objective. 
The policies, however, appear to identify specific means to accomplish 
the deadline-driven goals of fishable and swimmable waters, wherever 
attainable by 1983, and zero-discharge of pollutants—at least from point 
sources—by 1985. Even these two time-defined goals appear to be 
ranked, with the earlier 1983 goal of fishable and swimmable waters 
identified as an “interim goal” en route to the 1985 zero-discharge 
goal.59 
A logical objection to this emphasis on the statutory goals and 
policies of the CWA is that hortatory congressional statements typically 
have no independent legal force and effect, and therefore can be over-
interpreted.60 Although many courts have quoted those aspirations in 
interpreting the operative provisions of the CWA,61 even referring to 
them as the “guiding star[s]” of the 1972 legislation,62 similar aspirations 
are included in many federal environmental statutes.63 One court 
58. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (establishing a national policy of providing federal financial 
assistance for publicly owned treatment works); id. § 1251(a)(5) (establishing a national policy to 
develop and implement areawide waste treatment management planning processes to ensure 
adequate pollution control); id. § 1251(a)(6) (establishing a national policy to conduct research and 
development necessary to develop the technology needed to eliminate pollutant discharges); id. 
§ 1251(a)(7) (establishing a national policy of developing and expeditiously implementing programs 
to control nonpoint source pollution).  
59. Id. § 1251(a)(2). 
60. See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (per curiam) (“[I]t frustrates 
rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s 
primary objective must be the law.” (emphasis in original)). 
61. See, e.g., United States v. Borowski, 977 F.2d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1992); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. 
Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Am. Paper Inst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328, 333 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976).  
62. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 612 F.2d 1232, 1236 (10th Cir. 1979); Am. Petrol. Inst. v. 
EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1028 (10th Cir. 1976).  
63. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006) (Endangered Species Act provision articulating a 
congressional purpose “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species 
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explained why the specific provisions of operative text in the statute 
must temper expectations about complete fulfillment of the statutory 
aspirations: 
Undeniably, Congress’s strong statement of its objective must color 
EPA’s and our interpretation of specific provisions of the Act. But, as 
any student of the legislative process soon learns, it is one thing for 
Congress to announce a grand goal, and quite another for it to mandate 
full implementation of that goal.64 
Why, then, should we focus on the extent to which the aspirations 
contained in the hortatory opening provisions of the CWA have been 
achieved? First, although it is true that statements of legislative goals 
and policies do not have legal force and effect absent legislative 
indications to the contrary, courts use such statements to interpret other 
statutory provisions.65 That has been true on numerous occasions in 
construing the CWA.66 On the other hand, courts sometimes specifically 
reject the operability of lofty legislative pronouncements in 
environmental statutes. This is perhaps most famously the case with the 
National Environmental Policy Act,67 but has also been true for the 
and threatened species depend may be conserved”); 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006) (National 
Environmental Policy Act provision establishing a “national policy which will encourage productive 
and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; [and] to promote efforts which will 
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare 
of man”); id. § 6902(b) (establishing a “national policy of the United States that, wherever feasible, 
the generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced or eliminated as expeditiously as feasible,” and 
waste that is generated is “treated, stored, or disposed of so as to minimize the present and future 
threat to human health and the environment”); id. § 7401(b)(1) (Clean Air Act provision 
establishing congressional purpose “to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources 
so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population”).  
64. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court noted that 
Congress intended the statutory objective to be tempered by economic, technological, and political 
realities, as reflected in specific exemptions or requirements of various operative provisions. Id. The 
court further stated: 
Moreover, the purposes section, in its own right, suggests that Congress recognized that the 
substantive provisions of the Act fall short of completely achieving the announced goals of the 
Act. Congress hedged the purposes section by making it apply only as “consistent with the 
provisions of this [Act],” and explicitly distinguished between the congressional “policy” to 
eliminate discharge of toxic pollutants and the presumably weaker “goal” of eliminating 
discharge of all pollutants. 
Id.  
65. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 n.7 (1981) (citing statutory preamble to interpret 
other provisions of Mine Safety and Health Act).  
66. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper, 612 F.2d at 1236; Am. Petrol. Inst., 540 F.2d at 1028.  
67. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (minimizing the 
significance of Congress’s substantive policy statements in favor of the operative procedural 
provisions of the statute).  
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CWA.68 
Second, although other federal environmental statutes contain 
similarly lofty rhetorical goals,69 arguably none of them articulate 
affirmative aspirations as clearly, as specifically, and as unambiguously 
as does the CWA. For example, the purpose of the Endangered Species 
Act is to “provide a means” to protect endangered species and the 
ecosystems on which they depend,70 and the policy of the National 
Environmental Policy Act is to “encourage” harmony between humans 
and the environment and to “promote efforts” to reduce or eliminate 
environmental harm.71 Although the CWA also includes aspirations to 
provide a means to achieve various statutory ends, the underlying 
objective is not simply to provide those means, but affirmatively to 
restore and maintain the “integrity of the Nation’s waters.”72 
Similarly, the stated goals and purposes of the Clean Air Act (CAA) 
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), respectively, 
are more qualified than are the analogous aspirations in the CWA. The 
CAA promises “to protect and enhance” air quality to an unspecified 
degree,73 and the RCRA commits only to “reduce[] or eliminate[]” waste 
generation to the extent feasible, and where it is not feasible to do so to 
“minimize” resulting threats to human health and the environment.74 By 
contrast, in addition to the overarching promise of complete restoration 
and maintenance of chemical, physical, and biological integrity, the 
1972 CWA included more specific commitments to provide water 
quality sufficient to support fishable and swimmable waters by 1983 
wherever attainable,75 and to eliminate point source discharges of 
pollutants by 1985.76 
Third, and most important, Congress included in the CWA specific 
operative provisions designed to implement the major aspirations in the 
statute’s opening statement, making it more difficult to simply ignore 
those aspirations as the product of lofty legislative pronouncements. 
68. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.  
69. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.  
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006).  
71. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).  
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).  
73. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1). 
74. Id. § 6902(b).  
75. 33 U.S.C. §1251(a)(2). But see supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text regarding 
alternative interpretations of this language.  
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).  
 
                                                     
04 - Adler Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2013  10:49 AM 
772 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:759 
Section 303(c) of the CWA77 most directly links one of the statute’s key 
operative provisions to the statement of goals and policies by providing 
that state water quality standards “shall be such as to protect the public 
health or welfare, enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes of 
this [Act].”78 In its water quality standards program regulations, EPA 
interprets this language to require state water quality standards to protect 
two minimum types of uses in all water bodies for which attainment of 
those uses is possible: (1) fish, shellfish, and wildlife, and (2) recreation 
involving human contact with water (“contact recreation”).79 Moreover, 
CWA section 301(b)(1)(C) required effluent limitations for point source 
discharges sufficient to meet those standards—and therefore to protect 
the minimum statutory uses of fishable and swimmable waters—by July 
1, 1977;80 the total “maximum daily load” (TMDL) provision requires 
states to develop and implement corrective measures for those waters 
that failed to meet those standards.81 Thus, Congress matched the 
statutory aspiration of fishable and swimmable waters by 1983 with very 
specific provisions to effectuate that goal. 
Similarly, in the 1972 legislation Congress backed up the 1985 zero-
discharge goal with specific statutory-implementing requirements, 
although with somewhat more liberal escape provisions to account for 
potential infeasibility. Moreover, as discussed further below, in the 1977 
and 1981 amendments Congress weakened those provisions in several 
significant ways.82 With respect to both municipal sewage and industrial 
point source discharges, Congress in 1972 adopted two sequential series 
of technology-based “effluent limitations” designed to move from 
pollutant abatement to pollutant elimination, with express requirements 
to achieve the zero-discharge goal wherever possible. 
For municipal sewage, Congress required publicly-owned treatment 
works (POTWs) to adopt “secondary treatment” technology to meet 
effluent standards adopted by EPA83 by July 1, 1977.84 However, 
Congress also imposed on POTWs a second round of stricter 
technology-based treatment requirements known as “best practicable 
77. Id. § 1313(c).  
78. Id. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).  
79. 40 C.F.R. § 131.2 (2012).  
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C). 
81. Id. § 1313(d)–(e).  
82. See infra notes 130–40 and accompanying text.  
83. EPA adopted secondary treatment standards by regulation. 40 C.F.R. § 133.102.  
84. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B).  
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waste treatment technology” (BPWTT).85 Congress defined BPWTT in 
section 201(b) of the 1972 amendments as “including reclaiming and 
recycling of water, and confined disposal of pollutants,”86 and in several 
other provisions and relevant legislative history clarified that the 
BPWTT standard was adopted to eliminate water disposal of sewage 
pollutants through wastewater recycling and reuse and land disposal of 
the remaining solids.87 
Congress adopted similarly ambitious zero-discharge requirements for 
industrial point sources, also in two phases. By July 1, 1977, the Act 
required those dischargers to adopt the “best practicable control 
technology currently available” (BPT),88 but the second round of 
industrial effluent limitations required the “best available technology 
economically achievable” (BAT) “which will result in reasonable further 
progress toward the national goal of eliminating the discharge of all 
pollutants,” and which “shall require the elimination of discharges of all 
pollutants if . . . such elimination is technologically and economically 
achievable for a category or class of point sources.”89 Similarly, for new 
industrial point sources Congress demanded the “greatest degree of 
effluent reduction . . . achievable through application of the best 
available demonstrated control technology, processes, operating 
methods, or other alternatives, including, where practicable, a standard 
permitting no discharge of pollutants.”90 Thus, although qualified by 
concepts of feasibility, Congress specifically backed up its zero-
discharge aspiration with enforceable discharge control requirements. 
Likewise, in the 1972 version of the CWA, Congress sought to 
implement the “no toxics in toxic amounts” aspiration with specific 
regulatory requirements. In section 307, Congress directed EPA to 
publish a list of toxic water pollutants, and to promulgate pollutant-
85. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, sec. 49, § 304, 91 Stat. 1566, 1588 (adding 
§ 304(d)(3), codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1314(d)(3)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments 
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, sec. 2, §§ 201, 301, 86 Stat. 816, 833–34, 845, repealed by Municipal 
Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-117, § 21(b), 95 
Stat. 1623, 1632 (repealing § 301(b)(2)(B)).  
86. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 §§ 201, 301(b), 86 Stat. at 833–34, 
844–45.  
87. For a more thorough discussion, see Robert W. Adler, Water and Wastewater Infrastructure 
in the United States: The Clean Water-Energy-Climate Nexus, 4 GEO. WASH. J. OF ENERGY & 
ENVTL. L. __ (forthcoming Summer 2013). 
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A). New source performance standards adopted under this provision 
must be included in all discharge permits for new sources. Id. § 1342(a)(1)–(b)(1).  
89. Id. § 1311(b)(2)(A).  
90. Id. § 1316(a)(1).  
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specific effluent standards or prohibitions for those pollutants.91 
Congress amended those requirements in 1977 to control toxic pollutants 
from industrial sources largely through the technology-based effluent 
limitations adopted under sections 301 and 304 of the Act,92 but in the 
amended version of section 307 Congress retained EPA’s authority to 
regulate pollutants, in the alternative, based on toxicity rather than 
feasibility.93 
It is significantly more difficult to evaluate the degree to which 
Congress adopted operative provisions designed to effectuate the 
overarching statutory objective to “restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”94 That 
objective requires full implementation of the entire statute in all its 
complexity. Clearly, Congress understood in 1972 that control of point 
sources alone—even to the point of zero discharge—would not suffice to 
attain the statutory objective given the pervasive nature of nonpoint 
source pollution.95 To address this problem, however, Congress enacted 
a series of comprehensive planning and control provisions designed, in 
theory, to identify and control the full range of pollution sources.96 
What is not so clear is whether Congress understood, at least in 1972, 
the breadth of reasons why the waters of the United States had lost their 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity, and the equally broad scope 
of actions needed to redress them. Although Congress adopted measures 
to address both point source and nonpoint source discharges of 
pollutants into the nation’s waters, it did not focus so clearly on other 
forms of water “pollution,” such as dams, water diversions, stream 
channelization, and loss or degradation of floodplains and other riparian 
habitats,97 and the tools needed to address those problems are far less 
91. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 307(a), 86 Stat. at 856–
57. Congress directed EPA to adopt those standards based on toxicity, persistence, degradability, 
presence in aquatic organisms and the importance of those organisms, and the nature and degree of 
impacts from those pollutants. Id.  
92. See Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 53(a), 91 Stat. 1566, 1589–90 (amending 
33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)).  
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2).  
94. Id. § 1251(a).  
95. See S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 39 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3705. 
96. See 33 U.S.C. § 1281 (calling for adoption of comprehensive waste treatment management 
plans); id. § 1288 (calling for area-wide waste treatment programs addressing multiple pollution 
sources); id. § 1313(d) (requiring total maximum daily load calculations for impaired waters); id. 
§ 1313(e) (requiring states to develop continuing planning processes to address aggregate water 
pollution problems).  
97. See ROBIN A. ABELL ET AL., FRESHWATER ECOREGIONS OF NORTH AMERICA, A 
CONSERVATION ASSESSMENT 17–20 (2000) (identifying diverse sources of impairment to U.S. 
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precise. Arguably, the one provision that focuses sharply on physical 
destruction of aquatic ecosystems, the permitting program that governs 
discharges of dredged or fill material into wetlands and other waters of 
the United States, has been among the least effective in achieving the 
goals and objectives of the statute.98 
Thus, although the operative provisions of the CWA implement the 
statutory goals and objectives inconsistently, it is clear that Congress 
adopted specific provisions designed to effectuate the goals articulated 
in section 101, rather than leaving them as entirely hortatory aspirations. 
The next section of this Article evaluates the effectiveness of each of 
these statutory provisions, and others, in achieving the aspirations 
Congress articulated for the nation’s waters in section 101 of the CWA. 
II.  THERE HAS BEEN A NOTABLE DECLINE OF ASPIRATION 
IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
The above description of the aspirations Congress established for the 
nation’s waters suggests three questions. First, to what degree have those 
aspirations been achieved in the four decades since the 1972 Act was 
adopted? Second, to the extent that some or all of those goals have not 
been attained, what might explain those failures? Third, is there any 
realistic hope of renewing the aspirations Congress adopted in 1972? 
A. Relative Attainment of CWA Aspirations 
Particularly given the degree of ambition reflected in CWA section 
101(a), it is not surprising that the record of attaining those aspirations is 
mixed. LaJuana Wilcher, EPA Assistant Administrator for Water under 
President George H.W. Bush, was fond of saying, “We can’t honestly 
say that all of our waters are fishable and swimmable, but at least they’re 
no longer flammable.”99 As aspirations go, this was a rather modest one. 
I do not, however, interpret Ms. Wilcher as suggesting that we should 
rest easy with the knowledge that rivers no longer catch on fire. She 
aquatic ecosystems); EPA, A PRIMER ON USING BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS TO SUPPORT WATER 
QUALITY MANAGEMENT 1 (2011) [hereinafter PRIMER ON USING BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS] 
(same).  
98. See infra notes 181–99 and accompanying text.  
99. I was a Senior Attorney and Director of the Clean Water Program at the Natural Resources 
Defense Council at the time I heard these speeches. I also served on the Management Advisory 
Committee to Ms. Wilcher. Ms. Wilcher was referring to the fact that the Cuyahoga River fire of 
June 22, 1969 provided some impetus for enactment of the 1972 CWA amendments. See Jonathan 
H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of Environmental Protection, 14 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 89, 92 (2002).  
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merely was indicating that significant progress had been made in 
cleaning up the nation’s waters even if additional problems remained. 
There is considerable evidence to support this “glass half full” picture of 
the nation’s clean water accomplishments since 1972. 
1. Progress Toward Zero Discharge 
There is little doubt that significant progress has been made in 
reducing point source pollutant discharges since 1972. In the case of 
municipal sewage, as of 2008, the number of U.S. residents served by 
advanced wastewater treatment systems increased from less than eight 
million to approximately 113 million, and the population served by less 
than secondary treatment100 declined from fifty million to fewer than 
four million.101 That resulted in an estimated 45% reduction in major 
pollutants discharged to surface waters in the face of a 35% increase in 
sewage inflow into the nation’s sewer systems.102 
Industrial dischargers show similar progress. States or EPA issued 
tens of thousands of NPDES permits to industrial facilities under CWA 
section 402.103 EPA estimates that the initial implementation of 
treatment requirements imposed under those permits reduced discharges 
of toxic pollutants dramatically, plus significantly larger reductions for 
100. Secondary treatment refers to the minimum level of treatment Congress deemed acceptable 
for municipal sewage. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B). EPA defined secondary treatment more 
specifically by regulation. 40 C.F.R. pt. 133 (2012). See generally DADE W. MOELLER, 
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 173 (3d ed. 2005).  
101. EPA, EPA-832-R-10-002, CLEAN WATERSHED NEEDS SURVEY 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
at ix (2010) [hereinafter CLEAN WATERSHED NEEDS SURVEY]. Approximately three quarters of the 
U.S. population is now served by centralized wastewater collection and treatment systems. Id. 
Moreover, a large percentage of treatment facilities that do not attain secondary treatment are 
subject to statutory waivers for certain ocean discharges. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(h); Clean Water Act 
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, sec. 44, § 301(h), 91 Stat. 1566, 1584.  
102. EPA, EPA-832-R-00-008, PROGRESS IN WATER QUALITY: AN EVALUATION OF THE 
NATIONAL INVESTMENT IN MUNICIPAL WASTEWATER TREATMENT, at ES-5 (2000) [hereinafter 
PROGRESS IN WATER QUALITY]. EPA’s forty-five percent decline estimate is based on reductions in 
the traditional measure of five-day biological oxygen demand (BOD5) used in EPA’s secondary 
treatment definition. See 40 C.F.R. § 133.102.  
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. According to data reported by EPA on NPDES permit backlogs, as of 
March 2013 there were 5082 permits for major industrial facilities out of 6699 facilities total, 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), Backlog Reduction, EPA.GOV, 
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/grade_2013.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2013); 32,890 permits for 
minor industrial facilities out of 39,459 total, id. 
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/grade_minor_2013.pdf; and non-storm water general permits 
covering 73,483 out of 80,279 facilities, id. http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/grade_all_2013.pdf. 
Overall, EPA estimates that more than 500,000 facilities require NPDES permits. EPA, EPA-833-R-
01-001, PROTECTING THE NATION’S WATERS THROUGH EFFECTIVE NPDES PERMITS, A STRATEGIC 
PLAN FY 2001 AND BEYOND 1 fig.1 (2001).  
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“conventional pollutants.”104 
Those reductions, however, bring us nowhere close to meeting the 
zero-discharge goal of the CWA. The obvious conclusion from a 45% 
reduction in sewage discharges is that 55% of those discharges continue 
nearly three decades after the statutory goal elapsed. Moreover, future 
population growth is likely to overwhelm past gains if we continue our 
current funding and other policies. EPA estimates that by 2016, total 
discharges of biological oxygen demanding pollutants from sewage105 
will be similar to what they were in the mid-1970s, and by 2025 they 
will approximate those that occurred before the 1972 CWA.106 
The same is true for industrial pollutant discharges. A large majority 
of the roughly 45,000 industrial NPDES permits allow discharges to 
continue, even if treatment requirements have reduced those releases in 
volume and toxicity. According to EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory 
(TRI),107 industries continued to discharge nearly a quarter of a billion 
pounds of toxic pollutants into U.S. surface waters in 2011,108 and those 
numbers have not changed significantly in nearly a decade.109 
2. Progress Toward Fishable and Swimmable Waters 
Although the strict zero-discharge goal epitomizes the overall 
statutory objective of full chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
the nation’s waters, most people probably care more about progress 
toward the fishable and swimmable goal of the CWA. As is true for 
zero-discharge, the record in meeting this goal is mixed. Within two 
decades of the Act’s passage, many more waterways were safer for 
swimming, many more fish were safer to eat, and many more 
populations of fish and aquatic life recovered.110 
We are a long way, however, from fully meeting the fishable and 
swimmable aspirations of the CWA. According to EPA’s most recent 
National Water Quality Inventory, 53% of the nation’s assessed river 
miles, 67% of its assessed estuarine surface area, 66% of its assessed 
104. See ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 16 (1993).  
105. See MOELLER, supra note 100, at 202–03 (explaining oxygen demanding pollutants and 
methods of measuring them).  
106. PROGRESS IN WATER QUALITY, supra note 102, at ES-6.  
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2006) (establishing a comprehensive reporting system for releases of 
identified toxic chemicals to the environment above prescribed reporting levels). 
108. EPA, 2011 TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY, NATIONAL ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 4 (2013).  
109. See id. at 6 fig.4 (depicting roughly constant releases to surface waters).  
110. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 104, at 22–29.  
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lake acreage, and 82% of its assessed wetlands acreage remain impaired 
in at least one respect.111 Similarly, a recent EPA assessment of the 
biological health of small streams, the first in a series of EPA biological 
assessments of different classes of water bodies,112 found that 42% were 
in poor condition, 25% were in fair condition, 5% were not assessed, and 
only 28% were in good condition.113 
Much, but not all, of this remaining water quality impairment is due 
to nonpoint sources, and so is independent of our failure to meet the 
zero-discharge goal of the CWA. According to one recent 
comprehensive analysis, large portions of the country remain at 
significant impairment risk due to nonpoint sources.114 Thus, not only 
have we failed to meet the ultimate statutory objective of restoring the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of more than half of the 
nation’s waters, we have not even met the “interim” 1983 goal of 
fishable and swimmable waters. 
3. No Toxics in Toxic Amounts 
Arguably the most pressing, but also perhaps the most reasonable, of 
the aspirations Congress articulated in the 1972 legislation was “no 
toxics in toxic amounts.” Even if point source discharges could not be 
eliminated by 1985, at a minimum it may have been more realistic to 
expect that those discharges could be treated to the point that they were 
no longer toxic.115 Even that more modest goal, however, clearly has not 
111. EPA formerly published biennial reports entitled the “National Water Quality Inventory, 
[Year] Report to Congress,” based on state reporting pursuant to CWA § 305(b), codified at 33 
U.S.C. § 1315(b) (2006). See, e.g., EPA, EPA 841-R-00-001, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY 
INVENTORY: 1998 REPORT TO CONGRESS (2000), available at 
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/305b/98report_index.cfm. Now, EPA publishes and 
analyzes the most recent data online. See EPA, WATERSHED ASSESSMENT, TRACKING, & 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESULTS: NATIONAL SUMMARY OF STATE INFORMATION, 
http://ofmpub.epa.gov/waters10/attains_nation_cy.control (last visited Sept. 2, 2013) [hereinafter 
NATIONAL WATERSHED ASSESSMENT]. The percentages were derived by dividing the threatened 
and impaired waters by the total number of assessed waters. The Assessment indicated that not all 
waters have been assessed for water quality attainment, so I base this analysis only on assessed 
waters.  
112. See EPA, EPA-822-R-02-048, SUMMARY OF BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAMS AND 
BIOCRITERIA DEVELOPMENT FOR STATES, TRIBES, TERRITORIES, AND INTERSTATE COMMISSIONS: 
STREAMS AND WADEABLE RIVERS (2002).  
113. See EPA, EPA-841-F-06-001, THE WADEABLE STREAMS ASSESSMENT: A COLLABORATIVE 
SURVEY OF THE NATION’S STREAMS (2006).  
114. Thomas C. Brown & Pamela Froemke, Nationwide Assessment of Nonpoint Source Threats 
to Water Quality, 62 BIOSCIENCE 136, 140–43 (2012); see also NATIONAL WATERSHED 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 111.  
115. Admittedly the issue of determining what concentrations of pollutants meet the definition of 
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been met. For example, U.S. Geological Survey monitoring has detected 
at least one pesticide in 97% of surface water samples and over 90% of 
fish samples.116 According to the National Water Quality Inventory, 
approximately 10,000 river miles and 500,000 acres of lakes have 
advisories against consuming fish by at least some population groups 
due to toxicity of that food source.117 Likewise, states reported 78,339 
river miles impaired by polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), 63,837 
impaired by mercury, 75,770 by other toxic metals, 16,819 by pesticides, 
4321 by dioxin, and 4474 by other toxic organic chemicals.118 
B. Possible Reasons for Failure of Aspiration 
It is extremely important to take stock of the progress made under the 
CWA in the past forty years. Arguably one reason for current anti-
regulatory sentiment is collective societal amnesia. Perhaps many people 
simply do not remember (or, in case of younger people, never 
experienced) the rivers catching fire, the massive fish kills, or the 
beaches filled with raw sewage that inspired Congress to pass the 1972 
CWA.119 Failing to celebrate those successes contributes to collective 
societal amnesia, which further fuels anti-regulatory rhetoric and 
contributes to the argument that aspirations in the CWA and other 
environmental statutes cost a lot of money but accomplish little more 
than making us feel self-righteous. 
At the same time, it is worth exploring potential reasons why the 
original aspirations Congress set forth in 1972 have not been met, and 
based on that analysis, whether new strategies can be devised to 
overcome the remaining gaps between aspiration and reality. I suggest 
three perspectives on why the aspirations set forth in the 1972 CWA 
have not been achieved to date. Rather than arguing that any one of these 
three explanations is “correct,” I suggest that each explanation is true to 
some degree, and in some contexts. 
The most “political” explanation is that the original statutory goals 
“toxic” is no easy task. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.  
116. U.S. GEOL. SURVEY, FACT SHEET 2004-3098, STUDIES BY THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 
ON SOURCES, TRANSPORT, AND FATE OF AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS (2004).  
117. See NATIONAL WATERSHED ASSESSMENT, supra note 111.  
118. See id.  
119. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 104, at 5–6. As just one telling example, a recent news story 
compared the annual swim in Boston’s Charles River to the time when people were advised to get 
tetanus shots if they fell in the river. Living on Earth: Love That Dirty Water, Swimming in Boston’s 
Charles River (radio broadcast week of June 7, 2013), available at 
http://www.loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=13-P13-00023&segmentID=3.  
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have been subverted at the administrative, judicial, and legislative levels, 
in whole or in part because of an imbalance of power between the 
interest groups involved in CWA implementation (particularly industry, 
state and local governments, and environmental or resource user 
groups). In other words, Congress meant what it said, but political forces 
have made full implementation difficult. A second, somewhat related 
explanation is that the aspirations Congress articulated in 1972 were so 
ambitious that those charged with implementing them never believed 
them to be achievable, and instead substituted what they viewed as more 
“realistic” goals. Congress meant what it said, but the implementing 
agencies chose to substitute their own policies in place of the stated 
legislative aspirations. The third possibility is that Congress intentionally 
established such ambitious aspirations without expecting that they would 
actually be achieved, instead hoping that they would prod more 
aggressive implementation than would otherwise occur. Congress meant 
what it said, but not literally. Each potential explanation is explored 
further below. 
1. Subversion Due to Imbalance of Power 
The cynical but perhaps realistic view is that the aspirations set forth 
in the CWA were subverted over time due to an imbalance in political 
and legal power among the parties interested in the statute’s 
implementation. This might be explained by agency capture theory or 
other factors.120 The common sense explanation is that the entities who 
would bear the costs of implementing the ambitious statutory aspirations 
had far more resources and political power to monitor, influence, and 
challenge in court the numerous steps necessary to effectuate the CWA 
than did the nonprofit organizations such as the Natural Resources 
Defense Council and Environmental Defense Fund121 who carried the 
banner on those issues on behalf of the public.122 Entities that had 
incentives to advocate for reduced compliance costs included most 
notably industrial point sources (a “who’s who” of major U.S. 
120. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal 
Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 315–21 (1991) (describing the effect of 
agency capture on EPA); Joel A. Mintz, Has Industry Captured the EPA?: Appraising Marver 
Bernstein’s Captive Agency Theory After Fifty Years, 17 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2005).  
121. I say this with all due respect to the effectiveness of those organizations, particularly given 
that I headed NRDC’s Clean Water Program for seven years.  
122. Case captions bearing the names of these organizations as lead plaintiffs are legion. See, e.g., 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 656 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. 
Costle, 636 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  
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manufacturing and resource extraction industries123) and the country’s 
large and small municipalities. 
There are many examples of this power imbalance in the history of 
CWA implementation at the legislative, administrative, and judicial 
levels of action. Although the large body of academic literature 
evaluating CWA implementation and effectiveness addresses many of 
these issues in significant detail,124 several examples at each level of 
activity illustrate the point adequately. 
a. Legislative Changes to Implementing Tools 
Congress has not changed the 1972 CWA from a broad structural 
perspective in the ensuing four decades.125 The principal aspirations 
described above remain in place verbatim, although Congress added 
other policy guidance, primarily to clarify the relative roles of the states 
and the federal government in areas of land and water policy.126 The 
basic dualities of the CWA statutory scheme remain in place: the 
technology-based and water quality-based approach to point source 
permitting,127 and the combined efforts to control point source and 
nonpoint source pollution128 with comprehensive planning and 
123. Captions from major lawsuits challenging early CWA implementation illustrate this point. 
See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) (challenging EPA’s practice 
of establishing enforceable effluent limitations for industrial sources by industry-wide regulation 
rather than individual facility permits); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(challenging stringency of effluent limitations for paper industry); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 
F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977) (challenging regulation of heat in effluent discharges); Am. Petrol. Inst. v. 
EPA, 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976) (challenging general applicability of effluent limitations for 
existing sources); Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (challenging EPA 
application of CWA variance provisions); Am. Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (challenging EPA authority to adopt effluent limitations guidelines for potato processing 
industry); Am. Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975) (challenging stringency of effluent 
limitations guidelines for slaughterhouses and meat packing facilities). 
124. See supra note 14 for examples.  
125. Congress did amend numerous important details of statutory implementation described 
below, in 1977, 1981, and 1987, with less comprehensive amendments at other times. See Water 
Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7, 7–90; Municipal Wastewater Treatment 
Construction Grant Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-117, 95 Stat. 1623, 1623–34; Clean Water 
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, 1566–612. The major CWA reauthorization 
originally scheduled for 1992, however, has yet to occur more than two decades after that deadline. 
126. See Clean Water Act of 1977, sec. 5(a), § 101(g), 91 Stat. at 1567 (amendment clarifying the 
relationship between CWA and state water rights and allocations). 
127. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1314, 1316 (2006) (imposing effluent limitations on industrial 
and municipal point sources based on both “best technology” obligations and water quality needs).  
128. See id. (establishing point source control requirements); id. §§ 1288, 1319 (establishing 
nonpoint source control programs). 
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accountability measures to ensure that the sum of the parts was at least 
as large as necessary to achieve the statutory goals.129 
Details always matter, of course, and in 1977 and 1981 Congress 
amended the statute in ways that effectively changed “zero-discharge” 
from reality to aspiration with respect to the majority of point source 
discharges. In the 1977 amendments, Congress added an intermediate 
level of industrial pollution treatment requirements known as “best 
conventional treatment” (BCT)130 for the most common water pollutants 
by volume.131 Although zero-discharge requirements technically remain 
in the statute for toxic and nonconventional pollutants132 and for new 
sources,133 given the large volumes of conventional pollutants that 
remain in industrial waste streams, BCT arguably signaled the death 
knell for zero-discharge requirements for many industrial sources.134 
Similarly, in the 1981 amendments that focused largely on the 
municipal wastewater program,135 Congress eliminated the second, 
stricter round of technology-based treatment requirements for publicly-
owned treatment plants.136 In doing so, Congress effectively abandoned 
its original vision of requiring municipal wastewater recycling and reuse 
as a path to zero-discharge.137 In addition, Congress added a series of 
variance provisions to the otherwise uniform program of technology-
129. See id. § 1281 (establishing requirements for area-wide waste treatment planning); id. 
§ 1288 (establishing requirement for comprehensive water pollution control plans); id. § 1313(d)–
(e) (establishing requirements for TMDLs and continuing state planning programs); id. § 1329 
(requiring state nonpoint source pollution control plans).  
130. See id. §§ 1311(b)(2)(E), 1314(b)(4) (establishing requirements for effluent limitations 
based on the best conventional pollution control technology).  
131. The statute identifies conventional pollutants as biological oxygen demand, suspended 
solids, fecal coliform, and pH, and authorized EPA to identify additional conventional pollutants by 
regulation. Id. § 1314(a)(4). 
132. See id. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (requiring elimination of discharges of toxic and nonconventional 
pollutants wherever technologically and economically achievable).  
133. See id. § 1316(a) (requiring zero-discharge from new sources where practicable).  
134. As discussed below, EPA did adopt zero-discharge requirements for a relatively small 
number of industrial point source categories. See Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation 
Council, 557 U.S. 261, 268–71 (2009).  
135. Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
117, 95 Stat. 1623, 1623–34. 
136. Id. sec. 21(b), § 301(b)(2)(B), 95 Stat. at 1632.  
137. For cases discussing the tension between the more ambitious recycling and reuse goals for 
POTWs and the practicalities of addressing raw sewage discharges in the short term, see 
Montgomery Environmental Coalition v. Costle, 646 F.2d 568 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Environmental 
Defense Fund v. Costle, 439 F. Supp. 980 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); City of North Miami v. Train, 377 F. 
Supp. 1264 (S.D. Fla. 1974).  
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based treatment controls,138 thereby allowing even further divergence 
from zero-discharge as EPA and state agencies wrote individual NPDES 
permits. Finally, Congress ultimately adopted a much more flexible set 
of control requirements for contaminated storm water discharges,139 
although those pollution sources arguably fall somewhere in between 
traditional point sources and nonpoint sources because they channel 
pollution from large urban areas or industrial sites into surface waters 
through pipes or other point sources.140 
Some history is necessary to put these legislative changes in 
perspective, because these seemingly large changes in legislative policy 
just five years apart were not quite as abrupt as might appear. When the 
1972 amendments were being debated, the National Water Commission 
raised serious doubts about the wisdom and cost-effectiveness of a zero-
discharge goal.141 In the 1972 Act, Congress commissioned a “mid-
course review” study to evaluate this and other issues.142 The Senate 
Committee explained that the mid-course study might provide it with the 
information necessary to evaluate, and if necessary to modify, the zero-
discharge goal: 
That information will assist the Nation in any decision on the 
proper enforcement mechanism to be established to support the 
goal, if appropriate, or a decision to refine the date for the 
attainment of the goal with greater precision, if required, or the 
extent of the exceptions to that goal, if any, or whether the costs 
associated with reaching this ultimate standard, in some 
instances, may far outweigh the benefits derived. In the interim, 
the goal set forth in Section 101 should provide the 
Administrator and the States with the direction and the mandate 
to direct research efforts toward developing the technology to 
138. E.g., Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, sec. 306, § 301, 101 Stat. 7, 35–37 
(authorizing modifications of industrial effluent limitations based on “fundamentally different 
factors” from those used in promulgating categorical effluent limitations); Clean Water Act of 1977, 
Pub. L. No. 95-217, sec. 43, § 301(g), 91 Stat. 1566, 1583 (providing modifications of effluent 
limitations for certain pollutants); id. sec. 44, § 301(h), 91 Stat. at 1584 (providing secondary 
treatment modifications for ocean discharges). 
139. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2006).  
140. This legislative change responded in part to EPA’s administrative strategy of exempting 
large categories of point source discharges from the NPDES program. See infra notes 159–164 and 
accompanying text. 
141. NAT’L WATER COMM’N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION 
70–71 (1973) [hereinafter NAT’L WATER COMM’N]. 
142. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, sec. 2, 
§ 305, 86 Stat. 816, 853–54 (adding CWA § 305). 
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apply a no-discharge standard. Without a clearly set goal of 
natural water quality achieved through application of a no-
discharge policy, it is not likely that resources will be applied to 
develop the means necessary to achieve an environmentally and 
ecologically sound water quality goal.143 
Congress also appointed a National Commission on Water Quality “to 
study the implications of achieving or not achieving the 1983 
requirements.”144 In the 1977 and 1981 amendments, Congress acted on 
the information provided by adopting the intermediate BCT standard and 
eliminating stricter technology-based controls for POTWs.145 It is more 
difficult to reconcile why Congress retained the zero-discharge 
aspiration while weakening the statutory implementing tools necessary 
to achieve the goal. Apparently, Congress elected to retain the overall 
aspiration146 in the hopes that technology would improve over a longer 
period of time, while bowing to practicality and cost concerns in short-
term practice. If that were the case, at least in theory technology-based 
standards should continue to be tightened over time, but as discussed 
below, that has rarely been the case.147 
Congress also backed off on its initially bold policy pronouncements 
in the area of nonpoint source pollution control. In the 1972 Act, 
Congress designed nonpoint source control provisions that were not 
nearly as stringent as those it adopted for point sources.148 In large part, 
Congress chose this strategy out of deference to state and local land use 
policy and the hope that the states would take aggressive action to 
control this half of the water pollution problem on their own.149 
However, Congress also suggested strongly that stricter provisions 
would be forthcoming if state programs proved insufficient.150 
143. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 11–12 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3678. 
144. S. REP. NO. 95-370, at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4327; see also 
NAT’L COMM’N ON WATER QUALITY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE NATIONAL COMMISSION 
ON WATER QUALITY 13 (1976).  
145. See supra notes 130–137 and accompanying text.  
146. In 1977, the Senate Committee indicated its view that “[l]ittle contained in the study of the 
[National Commission on Water Quality] could be construed as justifying major changes in the 
direction established in 1972.” S. REP. NO. 95-370, at 1, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4327.  
147. See infra notes 172–173 and accompanying text.  
148. See 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (2006) (providing for state water quality management plans to address, 
inter alia, nonpoint source pollution, but with no specific mandates).  
149. See S. REP. NO. 95-370, at 9, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4335 (indicating that the 
1977 committee continued to believe “that these matters were appropriately left to the level of 
government closest to the sources of the problem”).  
150. In 1971, Congress expressed its strong expectation that state controls “will be applied as 
soon as possible.” S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 39 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3706. 
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Unfortunately, Congress failed to make good on this implicit promise 
to strengthen controls on polluted runoff (nonpoint sources) if states 
failed to do so themselves. The congressional response in the 1977 
amendments was to give states more time to tackle an admittedly 
difficult set of issues.151 A decade later, Congress finally stepped in with 
new requirements governing state nonpoint source pollution control 
programs.152 Those requirements, however, while more specific than 
those adopted in the 1972 law, continued to defer almost entirely to state 
prerogatives, and lacked the kind of federal backup provisions that were 
built into the point source and water quality standards programs.153 As a 
result, progress in controlling nonpoint source pollution—which is 
clearly essential to achieving the overarching statutory goal of chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters—continues to 
lag significantly behind efforts to regulate point source discharges.154 
b. Administrative Tempering of Statutory Goals 
Administrative agencies often face the daunting task of implementing 
statutes with ambitious goals in the face of practical reality. Given the 
degree of aspiration Congress pronounced in the CWA relative to the 
magnitude of the task, that was certainly the case for EPA, the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers,155 and state and interstate water quality 
agencies. Nevertheless, in a number of significant respects, the failure of 
aspiration in the CWA might be attributed to excessive timidity in 
agency administration of the Act in the face of pressure from those who 
would bear the costs of implementation. It may be legitimate for an 
agency to interpret ambiguous statutory commands under a lens of 
pragmatism,156 but that practice is more questionable when the effect is 
to substantially temper the goals and purposes Congress set forth in the 
151. See S. REP. NO. 95-370, at 9, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4335.  
152. 33 U.S.C. § 1329.  
153. Compare id. (authorizing federal efforts to identify waters impaired by nonpoint source 
pollution but not federal control programs), with id. § 1313(c) (authorizing federal adoption of water 
quality standards in states that failed to do so adequately), and id. § 1342(c)–(d) (authorizing federal 
veto of deficient state NPDES permits or federal NPDES programs in states that fail to administer 
the point source control program adequately).  
154. See William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act Been a Success?, 
55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 593 (2004); Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 14, at 132–33; David Zaring, 
Note, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The Clean Water Act’s 
Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 521–28 (1996).  
155. As discussed infra notes 181–199, Congress delegated to the Secretary of the Army the task 
of implementing section 404 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, in conjunction with EPA. 
156. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864–66 (1984).  
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law.157 Although the full history of CWA implementation at the 
administrative agency level would be voluminous, and would require an 
extensive analysis of implementation by the states as well,158 a few key 
examples illustrate the point. 
Achieving the goal of zero-discharge from point sources turned on 
two categories of implementing actions. First, the agencies needed to 
identify all point sources and require them to obtain NPDES permits so 
that the combination of treatment obligations set forth in the statute 
could be implemented and enforced. Second, the agencies had to 
promulgate treatment regulations designed to achieve zero-discharge 
over time as technology improved, and to implement those obligations 
through NPDES permits. In both respects, there was a significant failure 
of implementation, and hence of aspiration. 
First, arguing administrative infeasibility, EPA defined the term 
“point source” by regulation in ways that exempt large categories of 
dischargers from the permit program, or subject them to less specific 
control obligations pursuant to general permits that cover large groups of 
dischargers categorically.159 Categories of point sources EPA thereby 
excluded from the full sweep of the NPDES program, or in some cases 
from any permit requirement at all, include concentrated agricultural 
feeding operations (CAFOs),160 concentrated aquatic animal production 
facilities,161 aquaculture facilities,162 municipal storm water 
discharges,163 and silvicultural operations.164 Exempting large groups of 
dischargers from the permitting program might make it more feasible to 
achieve the congressional zero-discharge goal for those sources that 
157. See David M. Driesen, Purposeless Construction, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97 (2013) 
(critiquing the Supreme Court’s increasing tendency to construe statutes without considering 
statutory purposes).  
158. States have the authority to implement numerous CWA programs. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313(c) (state review of water quality standards); id. § 1342(b) (state NPDES permitting 
program); id. §1344(g) (state administration of the section 404 dredge and fill program); see also 
supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing various state planning programs). 
159. Compare Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1337–38 (2013) 
(upholding EPA’s decision to exempt from NPDES permit requirement channelized discharges 
from logging roads), with Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1379, 1381–82 
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (overruling EPA’s decisions to exclude categories of point sources form NPDES 
program based on principles of feasibility, but authorizing use of general or area-wide permits). 
160. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 (2012); Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 750–51 
(5th Cir. 2011).  
161. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.24.  
162. See id. § 122.25.  
163. See id. § 122.26.  
164. See id. § 122.27.  
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remain regulated. Equally clearly, however, that practice weakens the 
overall statutory goal of eliminating as many pollutant discharges as 
possible. 
Second, even for those large categories of dischargers that EPA 
included in the NPDES program, very few have been subject to 
enforceable zero-discharge requirements. A quick perusal of the detailed 
regulations EPA adopts to define effluent limitations for various 
categories of industrial point sources demonstrates that the vast majority 
allow significant ongoing discharges.165 In the legislative history of the 
1972 amendments, Congress expressed that it understood the limitations 
of end-of-pipe treatment technology, and its accompanying expectation 
that the first round of BPT regulations would reduce, but rarely 
eliminate, pollutant discharges.166 However, Congress also 
communicated a clear expectation that recycling and reuse of waste 
materials and other process changes—in lieu of end-of-pipe waste 
treatment—would allow the elimination of discharges of pollutants to 
surface waters from industrial processes in the BAT and NSPS rounds of 
rulemaking for industrial sources.167 
Third, the entire system of industrial technology-based standards 
arguably has ossified to a significant degree. Implementation of 
industrial effluent limitations has reduced surface water discharges 
significantly,168 and EPA continues to adopt new standards for industries 
previously subject only to facility-by-facility analysis.169 The 
congressional expectations for zero-discharge, however, have not been 
met. Even the initial expectation that BAT requirements would exceed 
BPT did not always materialize, and in many effluent limitations 
guidelines the two sets of standards are identical or nearly so.170 When 
Congress added BCT to the mix of industrial treatment standards, it 
165. See id. pts. 405–17.  
166. See S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 42–44 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3710–11.  
167. See id. at 45–46, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3711–12.  
168. See supra Part III.A.1.  
169. In section 402(a) of the CWA, Congress authorized permits “prior to the taking of necessary 
implementing actions . . . [based on] such conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary 
to carry out the provisions of this chapter.” 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2006). Known more 
colloquially as “best professional judgment” or “BPJ” effluent limitations, Congress intended 
individual permit writers to estimate the applicable effluent limitations for facilities until EPA 
promulgated the intended categorical regulations for that category of facility. See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 122.44(a)(1). However, EPA still has not promulgated regulatory effluent limitations for all 
industrial point sources, despite additional urging from Congress in the 1987 amendments. See 33 
U.S.C. § 1314(m) (requiring EPA to complete the task of adopting industrial effluent limitations 
guidelines).  
170. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 410.12, 410.13 (BPT and BAT effluent limitations identical). 
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became even less likely that the second round of treatment standards 
would result in zero-discharge, despite the continued zero-discharge 
preference in BAT and NSPS standards for toxic pollutants.171 
Moreover, EPA has not followed through with Congress’s 
expectation that treatment technology would improve over time, leading 
to increasingly stringent effluent limitation requirements over time until 
the ultimate goal of zero-discharge was achieved. Although EPA has 
adopted relatively small changes to some industrial standards over time, 
many effluent limitations regulations remain identical to those 
promulgated decades ago.172 It is certainly possible that Congress simply 
over-estimated the potential for innovation in water pollution control 
methods from 1972 forward, but advances in many other areas of 
engineering and technology suggest otherwise. By analogy, if telephone 
technology were dictated by similar federal regulatory standards, we 
would be stuck with the same fixed location telephones that existed in 
the mid-1970s, perhaps having advanced from rotary dial to push tone 
technology but nowhere close to modern smart phones. In the case of 
pollution controls, that tendency has generated a robust academic debate 
about the relative technology-forcing characteristics of prescriptive or 
proscriptive regulation compared to effluent fees or other economic 
incentives.173 For purposes of this Article, however, the fact remains that 
the system of technology-based standards Congress hoped would drive 
steadily toward zero-discharge remains stuck in the world of end-of-pipe 
treatment, nowhere close to the intended statutory goal. 
EPA’s track record in implementing the water quality standards side 
of the CWA implementation scheme, in particular the effort to achieve 
fishable and swimmable waters wherever attainable by 1983, is similarly 
mixed. EPA’s regulations governing state water quality standards are 
admirably firm in some respects. For example, EPA interprets the term 
“wherever attainable” quite strictly. States may adopt water-body-use 
171. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.  
172. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pt. 405 (Dairy Products Processing Point Source Category, promulgated 
1974 and amended once in 1995); id. pt. 406 (Grain Mills Point Source Category, last amended 
1995); id. pt. 407 (Canned and Preserved Fruits and Vegetables Processing Point Source Category, 
last amended 1995).  
173. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The 
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988) (arguing that economic 
incentives would generate more innovation than technology-based regulations); D. Bruce La Pierre, 
Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771 (1977) 
(critiquing the degree of innovation generated by Clean Air Act automobile standards). But see 
Wendy A. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83 (lauding 
the effectiveness of technology-based standards in generating innovation and leveling the playing 
field among dischargers). 
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designations and accompanying water-quality criteria less stringent than 
necessary to protect fishable and swimmable waters only under narrowly 
confined circumstances that amount largely to physical impossibility due 
to natural conditions.174 States are required to adopt and implement 
standards for a wide range of contaminants and to protect a range of 
typical water-body uses.175 
On the other hand, progress toward actual attainment of those water 
quality standards remains largely stuck in the same place it has been for 
several decades: large percentages of U.S. surface waters continue to 
exceed applicable water quality standards or otherwise fail to attain 
designated uses.176 One obvious explanation for this status, discussed 
elsewhere in this Article, is the ineffective approach to the nonpoint 
source pollution responsible for a large percentage of water body 
impairment nationally.177 From an administrative perspective, however, 
EPA delayed for several decades implementation of the comprehensive 
accounting and control regimen (TMDLs) designed to attain water 
quality standards in those waters for which the first round of technology-
based effluent limitations were insufficient to do so.178 Even after EPA 
began to take the TMDL program seriously, goaded in large part by a 
rash of citizen suits,179 it declined to adopt a firm requirement that 
TMDLs include implementation plans similar to those designed to 
address the analogous problem of aggregate pollution in the CAA.180 
The section 404 permitting program181 is another key example of a 
major statutory program that has arguably been subverted in ways that 
contravene the basic aspirations Congress set forth in the 1972 CWA. 
Technically, section 404 simply provides a second permitting 
mechanism (in addition to NPDES permits) through which the Secretary 
174. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(g).  
175. See id. §§ 131.10, 131.11.  
176. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.  
177. See supra notes 148–154 and accompanying text.  
178. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006). For an excellent, detailed history of the reasons for this delay 
and the ensuing battle over TMDL program implementation, see OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION (2d ed. 2002). See also Kelly 
Seaburg, Murky Waters: Courts Should Hold That the “Any-Progress-Is-Sufficient-Progress” 
Approach to TMDL Development Under Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act Is Arbitrary and 
Capricious, 82 WASH. L. REV. 767 (2007).  
179. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ga. 1996); Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc. v. Fox, 909 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. Reilly, 796 F. 
Supp. 1374 (W.D. Wash. 1992), aff’d, 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994).  
180. See Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air 
Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203 (1999).  
181. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344.  
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of the Army (in practice through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) can 
authorize discharges of certain limited categories of pollutants, 
specifically “dredged or fill material” into navigable waters at “specified 
disposal sites.”182 The Corps is supposed to issue only those permits that 
are in compliance with guidelines promulgated by EPA, designed to 
protect the integrity of the nation’s waters from a wide variety of adverse 
effects,183 and subject to EPA’s authority to prohibit disposal at certain 
sites when necessary to prevent “unacceptable adverse effects” to the 
nation’s waters.184 
Initially, the Corps of Engineers exempted from the section 404 
permitting program any discharges to wetlands by defining the “waters 
of the United States” as waters that were navigable in fact.185 But 
wetlands comprise ecologically critical portions of the nation’s waters 
and are essential to fulfill the statutory goal of restoring the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of those waters.186 The agencies 
amended the program to include wetlands only after environmental 
groups successfully challenged that practice in court,187 and that 
regulatory effort, in turn, has generated a running legal battle over which 
wetlands are properly covered by the program.188 
Even after those regulations went into effect, however, the program 
has not been implemented in a way that has effectively promoted the 
statutory objective of restoring and maintaining the physical, chemical, 
or biological integrity of the nation’s waters. For perspective, NPDES 
permits typically allow limited discharges of pollutants into flowing 
water bodies, where the resulting impairment must be limited by the 
combination of technology-based and water quality-based control 
requirements.189 Section 404 permits, by contrast, often allow discharges 
of dredged and fill material that can fill water bodies entirely, thus 
resulting in their complete destruction.190 It is difficult to conceptualize a 
182. Id. § 1344(a).  
183. Id. § 1344(b).  
184. Id. § 1344(c).  
185. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985).  
186. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WETLANDS: CHARACTERISTICS AND BOUNDARIES 42 
(1995).  
187. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (2012) (defining “waters of the United States” as including 
wetlands for purposes of the section 404 permit program); 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (July 25, 1975) 
(describing regulatory history in the wake of Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. 
Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975)).  
188. See infra notes 212–215 and accompanying text.  
189. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342. 
190. 33 C.F.R. § 323.3 (2012). Indeed, the definition of “fill material” is material that “has the 
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program that is less consistent with the overall statutory aspiration of the 
CWA than one that allows entire water bodies, or significant portions of 
them, to be destroyed entirely. 
EPA’s section 404(b) regulations191 include a long series of 
constraints designed to guard against this perverse result to some extent. 
Two of those constraints are most pertinent here. First, by prohibiting 
the issuance of section 404 permits when “a practicable alternative[s] to 
the proposed discharge” would accomplish the same project purpose,192 
particularly for projects that do not depend on access to water,193 EPA’s 
intent is to eliminate unnecessary wetland fills and thereby to maintain 
the integrity of those waters. In practice, the vast majority of section 404 
permits are issued, with what some have decried as a highly ineffective 
evaluation of alternatives,194 resulting in what appears to be more of a 
presumption that wetlands can be destroyed rather than the opposite. 
Nevertheless, the filling of America’s wetlands slowed following 
application of the section 404 permitting program to wetland fills, and 
although scientists remain cautious about comparing the functional 
values of wetlands as opposed to raw acreage, some net gains in 
wetlands acreage have been reported more recently.195 
Second, the EPA and Corps of Engineers regulations governing the 
section 404 program attempt to offset any ecological harm resulting 
from wetland fills by mandating the implementation of “compensatory 
mitigation” sufficient to replace the wetlands values and functions lost or 
damaged because of the fill.196 Restoring or replacing wetlands values 
and functions is no easy task, however, and the efficacy of compensatory 
mitigation has been questioned from a scientific perspective.197 In 2008, 
effect of . . . (i) [r]eplacing any portion of a water of the United States with dry land; or (ii) 
[c]hanging the bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the United States.” Id. § 323.2(e)(1). 
191. 40 C.F.R. pt. 230. 
192. Id. § 230.10(a).  
193. Id. § 230.10(a)(3).  
194. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives Under Section 404 of 
the Clean Water Act and Similar Environmental Laws, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 773 (1989).  
195. See T.E. DAHL, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN 
THE CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES 1998 TO 2004, at 43–46 (2006) (reporting modest net gains in 
wetlands acreage from 1998–2004 but noting predominant gains in freshwater ponds relative to 
other wetland types, and declining to evaluate wetland quality); COMM. ON MITIGATING WETLAND 
LOSSES, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT 16–20 (2001) [hereinafter COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES] (reporting trend of 
historical wetland losses that the Corps of Engineers reports will be reversed due to compensatory 
mitigation, but reserving judgment on the efficacy of mitigation due to insufficiency of data). 
196. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 230, subpt. J (Compensatory Mitigation for Loss of Aquatic Resources).  
197. See COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES, supra note 195, at 22–45, 70–73 (concluding 
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EPA and the Corps revised their regulations governing compensatory 
mitigation in response to legislation requiring greater accountability in 
the program.198 Although the new regulations include significantly 
stricter standards and procedures for compensatory mitigation,199 it is 
probably too early to evaluate how much better the new program will be 
in fulfilling CWA aspirations. 
Finally, no statutory or regulatory regime is likely to fulfill its goals 
absent adequate enforcement against parties who fail to comply with 
statutory or regulatory obligations. The CWA confers on EPA the 
authority to prosecute violations through administrative, civil, and 
criminal processes,200 and further provides for citizen suits as a 
supplementary enforcement tool.201 Evaluating the effectiveness of 
statutory enforcement is difficult, but at least some commentators have 
argued persuasively that some of the aspirations of the CWA have been 
subverted by inadequate enforcement as well as insufficient 
administrative implementation.202 
c. Judicial Deference 
The judicial branch arguably has also played a role in subverting the 
aspirations of the CWA in two separate respects. First, courts routinely 
uphold EPA’s decisions to construe the statute narrowly in the face of 
political or pragmatic considerations. Second, the judicial branch itself—
led by the Supreme Court—has at times interpreted the statute in ways 
that appear to run afoul of the key aspirations that Congress set forth in 
the opening provisions of the law. 
The standards of review articulated by the Supreme Court in the field 
of federal administrative law admittedly suggest judicial deference to 
agency interpretation of ambiguous statutes.203 The problem, as 
Professor Driesen has suggested, is that goals provisions are a part of 
that restoration is easier for some wetland types relative to others, and that it is difficult to track 
mitigation success). 
198. Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594 (Apr. 10, 
2008) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 325 and 332; 40 C.F.R. pt. 230).  
199. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.93 (establishing general requirements for compensatory mitigation); id. 
§ 230.95 (establishing ecological performance standards for wetland mitigation).  
200. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006).  
201. Id. § 1365.  
202. See, e.g., Drelich, supra note 13; Flatt, supra note 13.  
203. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983); 
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).  
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statutes.204 They should mean something, and agencies and courts alike 
should consider them in interpreting statutory provisions that might be 
ambiguous in isolation, but are not when read in conjunction with the 
statutory goals. 
I certainly do not mean to suggest that the federal executive is always 
wrong in its interpretation of ambiguous CWA provisions, or even that it 
is wrong most of the time. As is true with respect to all of the complex 
environmental statutes Congress has entrusted EPA with administering, 
the job is difficult and fraught with delicate balancing acts. However, 
there are several important examples of cases in which the courts have 
deferred to agency interpretations of the CWA that arguably contravene 
the statutory goals.205 
One prominent example is Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska 
Conservation Council,206 in which the Supreme Court upheld a joint 
decision by EPA and the Corps of Engineers that subverted the zero-
discharge aspiration of the CWA. The case involved one of the rare 
instances in which EPA’s effluent limitations guidelines for a category 
of discharger mandated zero discharge.207 The agencies, however, 
allowed the discharger to circumvent the zero-discharge requirement by 
authorizing the discharge pursuant to a section 404 permit rather than a 
section 402 permit, thus allowing entirely untreated discharges of mine 
tailings into a pristine Alaskan lake.208 The federal district court in 
Alaska upheld the agency’s action but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed in an opinion that focused strongly on the statutory 
goals and purposes.209 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of 
Appeals, deferring to the agencies despite the rather clear divergence 
between the agency decision and the statutory aspiration of zero-
204. See Driesen, supra note 157. 
205. See Mark A. Latham, (Un)restoring the Chemical, Physical, and Biological Integrity of Our 
Nation’s Waters: The Emerging Clean Water Act Jurisprudence of the Roberts Court, 28 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 411 (2010); Mark Squillace, The Judicial Assault on the Clean Water Act, FED. LAW., 
July 2012, at 33. 
206. 557 U.S. 261, 291 (2009). In the interest of full disclosure, I co-authored an amicus brief 
urging the Supreme Court, unsuccessfully, to uphold the decision of the Ninth Circuit below. See 
Brief for the Honorable G. Tracy Meehan, Former Assistant Administrator for Water at the EPA as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 
557 U.S. 261 (2009) (Nos. 07-984 and 07-990).  
207. 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(b)(1) (2012) (prohibiting discharges of process wastes from new source 
mines using the froth flotation treatment process). 
208. Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 268–71.  
209. Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 486 F.3d 638, 644–45 (9th 
Cir. 2007).  
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discharge wherever possible.210 
The Supreme Court has also acted more affirmatively to curtail the 
reach of the CWA in a series of cases narrowing the potential geographic 
reach of the statute.211 The details and potential impact of those 
decisions, in which the Court specifically declined to defer to agency 
interpretations of the CWA and instead relied on other modes of 
statutory construction,212 have been reviewed extensively elsewhere.213 
For purposes of this analysis, those cases are noteworthy because they 
arguably contravene the principles of judicial review the courts have 
relied on not only to uphold the agency’s own subversion of CWA 
aspirations, but to justify independent judicial subversion of those goals 
as well. In particular, by excluding from CWA jurisdiction wetlands that 
provide essential ecological and hydrological functions to the nation’s 
water systems and aquatic ecosystems,214 and by potentially narrowing 
the scope of what discharges of pollutants into water bodies require 
permits, the Court has jeopardized the overarching statutory aspiration of 
restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical, and biological integrity 
of the nation’s waters. 
2. The Pathology of Excessive Aspiration? 
A second, far less complicated but equally viable, reason for the 
failure of aspiration in the CWA may be that we fail to meet the kinds of 
aspirations Congress sometimes embeds into statutes because they are 
written with so much aspiration. Although seemingly counter-intuitive, 
this theory suggests that the agency officials and others charged with 
210. Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 291; see also Chantz Martin, Comment, The Clean Water Act 
Suffers a Crushing Blow: The U.S. Supreme Court Clears the Way for the Mining Industry to 
Pollute U.S. Waters [Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458 
(2009)], 49 WASHBURN L.J. 933 (2010).  
211. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (split opinions interpreting the relative 
degree of nexus required between isolated waters and navigable waters to warrant CWA 
jurisdiction); S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) 
(holding that discharges must be to “meaningfully distinct” bodies of water to require NPDES 
permits); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) 
(invalidating regulatory interpretation justifying CWA jurisdiction based on use by migratory birds).  
212. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739 (relying on dictionary definition of “waters” rather than 
agency’s regulatory definition in order to read the statute narrowly); Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. 
at 172–73 (reading CWA narrowly to avoid constitutional interpretation rather than employing 
traditional principles of deference).  
213. See THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT: FIVE ESSAYS (L. Kinvin Wroth ed., 
2007); Colburn, supra note 14.  
214. See PATRICK COMER ET AL., NATURESERVE, BIODIVERSITY VALUES OF GEOGRAPHICALLY 
ISOLATED WETLANDS IN THE UNITED STATES (2005). 
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implementation of the statute believe that the goals are so ambitious that 
they cannot possibly be met. As a result, no one actually tries, or even 
takes the goals very seriously. Instead, the entities that implement the 
law (agencies, courts, etc.) set their own more “realistic” goals that 
effectively become the real goals of the statute. Collectively, we either 
ridicule the aspirations set forth in the statute as political posturing by 
members of Congress, or give them a “wink and a nod” but ignore them 
in practice. Others have explained this phenomenon by arguing that 
ambitious statutory aspirations allow Congress to act virtuous while 
leaving the agencies with the difficult task of implementing those 
goals.215 Instead of consuming the entire statutory banquet and paying 
the full bill, the agencies go on a diet, or perhaps order a la carte. 
This theory is supported by the generally negative reaction of the 
professional water resources community to the aspirations in the CWA, 
as reflected in the final report of the National Water Commission to the 
President and to Congress submitted in June 1973, just eight months 
after the 1972 legislation.216 With respect to the overall objective and 
definition of pollution, the Commission candidly reported: “This is not a 
good standard on which to base the definition of pollution.”217 The 
report was even more critical of the zero-discharge goal: “The 
Commission believes adoption of ‘no discharge’ as a national goal for 
water quality management is no more sound than would be the 
establishment of a ‘no development’ goal for controlling land use.”218 
More specifically, the Commission expressed the view that the zero-
discharge aspiration was not attainable given available technology, and 
that Congress assumed without proper justification that water was more 
valuable than other resources that might be impaired in meeting the 
zero-discharge goal, in an “imputation of an extravagant social value to 
an abstract concept of water purity.”219 
By contrast, the National Water Commission expressed a more 
favorable—if qualified—view of the fishable and swimmable waters 
aspiration: “Standards based on present and proposed water uses not 
only represent the most rational national water quality policy from a 
cost-benefit standpoint, they also permit maximum adaptability of 
215. See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990).  
216. NAT’L WATER COMM’N, supra note 141.  
217. Id. at 69. 
218. Id. at 70.  
219. Id. The Commission, by contrast, feared that the costs of attaining the zero-discharge goal 
might vastly exceed the benefits. Id.  
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national goals to local situations.”220 This more favorable view of the 
water quality-based aspirations of the CWA is qualified because the 
Commission believed that the uses to be protected “should be 
determined by responsible public authorities.”221 This perspective differs 
from the statutory aspiration in two significant ways. First, the 
Commission apparently believed that individual states or localities 
should make the value-based determinations of which uses were 
appropriate in which water bodies, in contrast to the national goal of 
fishable and swimmable waters articulated by Congress. Second, the 
Commission did not endorse the idea that the fishable and swimmable 
goal should apply presumptively to all waters “wherever attainable.”222 
Rather, the Commission believed that some water bodies could be 
designated for agricultural use, industrial use, or even “disposal and 
transport of wastes.”223 Thus, even though the Commission endorsed 
water quality aspirations in concept, its version of the concept was far 
more flexible and less ambitious than that expressed by Congress in the 
1972 law.224 
In other words, perhaps those more modest goals were what “the 
experts” in the water quality arena expected from the start. In their view, 
it was possible to reduce the volume and toxicity of water pollution 
discharges through adoption of the best available technology, but it 
would be a waste of society’s resources to eliminate those discharges 
entirely, if that goal was attainable at all. Likewise, it was reasonable 
and pragmatic to establish targets for improved water quality based on 
220. Id. at 71.  
221. Id. at 70.  
222. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (2006).  
223. Id. Even under the current CWA system as implemented by EPA regulations states must 
adopt designated uses that include agricultural and industrial purposes. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(a) 
(2012). However, states still must designate waters for fishable and swimmable uses wherever 
attainable. See id. § 131.2. States may not designate waters for “waste transport or waste 
assimilation” uses. Id. § 131.10(a). Moreover, because the most stringent applicable water quality 
criterion governs in any water body, id. §§ 131.11, 131.12, it is quite different to allow less 
protective uses as part of a suite of designated uses than to allow them as the only use that dictates 
the stringency of water quality criteria that apply to that water body.  
224. An anecdote based on personal recollection suggests that similar views persisted long after 
the 1972 legislative debate, and undoubtedly to this day. I served as Vice Chairman of Water 
Quality 2000, a multi-interest group policy forum on national water pollution control issues 
convened by the Water Environment Federation and others. See WATER QUALITY 2000, WATER 
ENVIRONMENT FEDERATION, A NATIONAL WATER AGENDA FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, FINAL 
REPORT (1992). At the opening meeting of that set of policy discussions, I recall an industry 
representative expressing the opinion that the goal of restoring the complete chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the nation’s waters would require a return to Pre-Columbian conditions in the 
United States, and that the zero discharge goal violated the second law of thermodynamics.  
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the actual desired beneficial uses of various water bodies, but not 
reasonable to expect that each water body should be treated the same. 
The uses and values of water bodies differ, as do the costs and feasibility 
of the improvements needed to attain other uses. If this view is accurate, 
one might argue that it is what was realistic all along; it is what we got 
out of the CWA in its first four decades; and we should be happy with 
the result—waterways that are far cleaner and more usable than they 
were in 1971, without having exhausted limited resources to tilt at the 
windmills of zero-discharge or complete restoration of the nation’s 
waters regardless of context or cost. 
The fundamental problem with this perspective of realism over 
aspiration is one of political legitimacy. Although this possible 
explanation for the failure to achieve the aspirations in the 1972 CWA 
may seem similar to the “balance of power” explanation, it actually 
differs in one important respect. The balance of power theory can be 
explained—although not justified—as a form of slow “policy creep,” a 
series of discrete decisions on individual regulatory issues influenced by 
the effective and well-funded or politically powerful advocacy of 
interest groups trying to minimize their implementation costs. As such, it 
does not necessarily reflect an intentional or considered policy to subvert 
the aspirations Congress set forth in the statute. The end result might be 
the same or similar, but at least it would not represent an intentional 
effort by the administrative or judicial officials, or both, to refute the will 
of the elected legislature. 
If the “excessive aspiration” explanation for the failure of CWA 
aspiration is correct, that reflects a far more serious and illegitimate 
subversion of the democratic process. Congress adopted, and the 
President signed into law, the aspirations set forth in section 101(a) of 
the CWA.225 Neither the National Water Commission nor the 
Administrator of EPA—or even the President of the United States—
possesses the authority to supplant those policy aspirations with less 
ambitious ones, however unwise they think them to be. If Congress 
intended those aspirations to be interpreted and implemented literally, 
the only legitimate remedy is to convince Congress to temper those 
aspirations by amending the statute. The conclusion may be different, 
however, as suggested in the following subsection, if Congress included 
such ambitious aspirations in the CWA for a different reason. 
225. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).  
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3. Aspiration as Asymptote 
The third potential explanation for the failure of aspiration in the 
CWA, somewhat counter-intuitively, is that Congress never actually 
believed that the ambitious aspirations in the statutory goals provisions 
would be met. Rather, Congress’s strategy was to set such an extremely 
high goal in the hope that the goal itself will induce the implementing 
agencies and others to achieve the highest standard possible, or at least a 
standard higher than otherwise would be attained. If this theory is 
correct, we should not worry too much when we fail to achieve the 
ultimate statutory aspirations. Rather, we should just keep trying harder 
in a continuous, asymptotic quest to get closer and closer to the statutory 
goals. Again, this “asymptotic” explanation sounds quite similar to the 
excessive aspiration theory, but with a very important difference. Under 
the latter theory, those entrusted with implementation of the CWA 
ignore the statutory aspirations or replace them with others they believe 
to be more realistic. Under the asymptotic theory, the agencies may 
adopt individual regulations or policies based on pragmatic realities, but 
they do not give up on the aspirations entirely. Instead, they continue to 
search for improved solutions in an effort to achieve the statutory 
aspirations wherever feasible, or as closely as possible. 
There are two main ironies to this explanation for the aspirations 
Congress incorporated into the CWA. First, it is the most difficult to 
prove because it is really a poker bluff theory. A poker bluff cannot 
work if you signal that you are “just kidding.” Likewise, pronouncing a 
statutory aspiration as a tool used to prod us to do more will not work if 
Congress (or EPA) says publicly that they are “just kidding.” There is 
not, therefore, and could not be, any clear indication to that effect in the 
legislative history. If the authors of the 1972 legislation intended their 
lofty aspirations simply as a means to prod the most aggressive 
implementation possible of the operative provisions of the law, clearly 
they would not have said so explicitly in either the statutory text or the 
legislative history.226 It does, however, make sense as a potentially 
legitimate justification for ambitious aspirations in the CWA and in 
other statutes. 
If this theory regarding Congress’s purpose in establishing lofty 
statutory aspirations is correct, it raises somewhat different questions 
about legitimacy. Is it appropriate for Congress to set aspirational goals 
that Congress itself views as unattainable? Does this lead to inefficient 
226. In the passage quoted above, the 1972 Senate Committee at least hinted that prodding was 
one function of the ambitious statutory goals. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.  
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use of scarce resources, and to frustration with the administrative 
process if not downright cynicism and a loss of faith in government? 
Other commentators have taken varying positions in this debate. 
Professor Doremus argued that the Endangered Species Act (ESA)227 is 
not a “failure” because so few species have successfully been recovered; 
rather, the recovery aspiration in the ESA serves as a source of 
continuing and essential protection for threatened and endangered 
species and the habitat that supports them.228 Similarly, Professor Sinden 
argues that absolute aspirations in environmental statutes provide a 
necessary counter-balance to powerful interests who seek to subvert 
statutory implementation.229 
Professor Schoenbrod, however, critiqued the legislative practice of 
establishing broad statutory goals with accompanying orders for an 
administrative agency to write complex rules to implement those 
aspirations rather than simply adopting rules of conduct directly in the 
statute.230 Similarly, Professor Dwyer criticized Congress’s practice of 
adopting “symbolic” legislation to sound virtuous without considering 
administrative feasibility and implementation, thus leaving the 
implementing agencies to pick up the pieces.231 
To some extent, this debate may turn on the issue discussed above 
regarding the legal force and effect of statutory goals and aspirations.232 
If Congress uses purely aspirational language in the provisions that 
establish statutory goals and objectives, and intends them to serve as 
asymptotic targets that may never be met but nevertheless prod us to 
achieve more than we otherwise would, it would appear less appropriate 
to consider that text as having enforceable meaning,233 at least absent 
clear indications to the contrary. Those provisions, however, may 
continue to serve as general guides to the interpretation of other statutory 
provisions. If, on the other hand, Congress “means what it says” in 
establishing ambitious statutory goals, and intends them actually to be 
227. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). 
228. Holly Doremus, Delisting Endangered Species: An Aspirational Goal, Not a Realistic 
Expectation, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,434, 10,435 (2000).  
229. Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental 
Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1487–511 (2005).  
230. David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 
UCLA L. REV. 740 (1983).  
231. See Dwyer, supra note 215, at 233–35. 
232. See supra Part II.C.  
233. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that EPA interpreted the 
fishable and swimmable goal in CWA section 101(a)(2) as having enforceable effect pursuant to 
specific language in section 303(c) of the Act).  
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attained, it seems illegitimate for administrative agencies and courts to 
simply ignore them in construing, implementing and enforcing the rest 
of the statutory scheme. 
III.  WE MIGHT RESTORE ASPIRATION TO THE CWA BY 
ADOPTING MORE PRECISE AND MORE MEANINGFUL 
DEFINITIONS OF GOALS FOR WATER BODIES 
Regardless of which of the three explanations (or combinations 
thereof) evaluated in Part III are more correct, it remains disturbing that 
efforts to attain the broadest aspirations set forth in the CWA appear to 
have been “stuck” in largely the same place for several decades. Just as 
there are several possible explanations for our collective failure to attain 
the aspirations set forth in the CWA over the past four decades, there are 
several possible responses to that state of affairs. 
First, if we accept the balance of power theory discussed above,234 we 
might simply accept that Congress writes aspirational goals that are 
always subject to legal and political push and pull, and can thereby be 
subverted to varying degrees. Those interest groups that bear the costs of 
CWA implementation (industrial dischargers, municipalities, 
landowners subject to the section 404 permitting program, etc.) will 
continue to advocate for less expensive—or more cost-effective—
implementation. Environmental groups and other non-governmental 
organizations representing user groups (fishing interests, recreationists, 
waterside landowners, etc.) will continue to push for more protective 
CWA implementation. Taken together, if the political power is balanced 
in a reasonable way, this “system” of participatory democracy will, in 
theory, produce the best balance under the circumstances. We can accept 
this as the reality of statutory implementation in a pluralistic society that 
provides opportunities for all affected interests to comment on 
administrative actions, challenge them in court if they do not like the 
final agency action, or lobby Congress to amend the statute if they do 
not like the judicial response. If there is a significant power disparity, 
however, one side or the other is likely to shift the fulcrum point, and the 
above analysis suggests that the balance has remained on the side of 
incomplete CWA implementation taken as a whole. 
Second, we could accept the view offered by the National Water 
Commission from the outset that the goals Congress set in 1972 were 
overly ambitious, and either implicitly (as we arguably have done to 
234. See supra Part III.B.1.  
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date) or more explicitly (through statutory amendments) revert to a more 
“realistic” set of goals we can more reliably meet.235 Perhaps the zero-
discharge goal Congress adopted was unrealistic (if not naïve) from the 
outset, although it remains viable to retain the more specific statutory 
commands to eliminate certain types of discharges wherever 
“technologically and economically achievable”236 without insisting on 
zero-discharge in all cases. Similarly, perhaps we need to conduct a form 
of triage with respect to the fishable and swimmable goal Congress 
adopted in the CWA. For many water bodies that goal has been attained, 
and for many others it still may be feasible. For other water bodies, 
however, for example those in very heavily urbanized areas or beset by 
pervasive nonpoint source pollution or physical and hydrological 
modifications, under this approach we should settle for “no longer 
flammable.”237 
There are several potential advantages to the approach of backing 
away from the most ambitious of the 1972 aspirations. It would probably 
be less expensive, although there is considerable evidence that strategies 
to eliminate rather than treat waste streams through pollution prevention 
strategies such as materials substitution and recycling or reuse can 
reduce rather than increase production costs and conserve valuable 
resources.238 It would probably be less controversial and less divisive, 
potentially allowing all of the parties responsible for CWA 
implementation to focus on effective implementation of the remaining 
aspirations. Arguably, people prefer realistic goals for which we can 
work reasonably hard and then actually declare success to goals that are 
frustratingly difficult if not impossible to attain, thus increasing the 
likelihood of actual success. 
The problem with these first two potential reactions, however, is that 
they prematurely foreclose the possibility that we might achieve the 
aspirations Congress adopted in 1972—however impressively ambitious 
they may seem to some—by thinking more creatively about approaches 
to achieve our initial goals. Perhaps the problem is not with the goals, 
but with limitations in the range of strategies we adopted to achieve the 
aspirations. Some of those strategies clearly have worked well, and we 
235. See supra notes 216–23 and accompanying text.  
236. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (2006) (requiring BAT effluent limitations for industrial 
point sources of certain pollutants).  
237. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Again, I am not asserting that Assistant 
Administrator Wilcher was advocating that policy, and I am quite confident she was not.  
238. See MARK H. DORFMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL DIVIDENDS: CUTTING MORE CHEMICAL 
WASTES (1992).  
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should retain and continue to improve them. Others have been far less 
successful, and might be revised significantly or replaced entirely. The 
most obvious example is the strategies adopted thus far to address 
nonpoint source pollution, and much has been written about those 
failures.239 
Here, however, I highlight and propose the expansion of a somewhat 
different shift in approach, which has been suggested by ongoing 
initiatives in CWA implementation. The basic proposed shift in our 
overall philosophy of CWA implementation is that the solution to 
excessive aspiration is more aspiration, or perhaps more accurately, a 
refined approach involving a more site-specific articulation of the 
aspirations for particular water bodies, accompanied by more targeted 
efforts to meet those redefined aspirations. 
A. Alternative Definitions of CWA Aspirations 
One common problem with broad aspirations is that they tend to be 
ambitious but vague. As a result, there is little clarity about what the real 
goal is, and even less clarity in determining the extent to which they 
have been met. How can we determine whether the ultimate aspiration of 
the 1972 CWA, to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the nation’s waters, has been met, for individual 
water bodies much less the “nation’s waters” as a whole? Even with 
respect to some of the subsidiary goals of the CWA, it can be difficult to 
define and measure relative success. The zero-discharge goal is 
relatively clear, at least as applied to point sources, but when have we 
achieved the goal of “fishable and swimmable waters,” or “no toxics in 
toxic amounts”? Although more useful definitions of the statutory 
aspirations will not in and of themselves magically produce attainment, 
as explained further below it is a useful first step in doing so. 
There are at least three existing efforts to expand on the CWA 
statutory goals in a more precise and specific way. Two of those 
initiatives have been only weakly recognized, and the third has been the 
subject of considerable analysis but not usually for the reasons I address. 
239. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Controlling Nonpoint Water Source Pollution: Is Help on the 
Way (From the Courts or EPA)?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,270 (2001); Douglas R. Williams, When 
Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail: Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural 
Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 21 (2002); Zaring, supra note 154, at 
521–28.  
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1. Biological Water Quality Criteria 
I have written previously about the degree to which biological water 
quality criteria, or “biocriteria,” have both theoretical and practical 
advantages in implementing the fundamental statutory aspiration to 
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
the nation’s waters.240 Rather than repeating those points here, my goal 
is to underscore how biocriteria can serve as one tool to define in a more 
robust and useful way what the basic statutory aspiration means for 
individual waters, and serve as a better measuring tool for determining 
the extent to which that aspiration has been met. That tool can reduce the 
frustration inherent in what has been a somewhat variable, ill-defined, 
and moving target in ascertaining whether the water quality goals of the 
CWA have been met in various regions.241 
By way of background, water quality standards are comprised, inter 
alia, of designated uses and water quality criteria to define the water 
quality conditions necessary to support and protect those uses.242 The 
minimum uses prescribed in CWA section 101(a)(2) establish the 
fishable and swimmable goal of the statute,243 and for purposes of this 
analysis it is important to understand that the use of biocriteria does 
nothing to subvert that basic requirement, and arguably can do a much 
better job of defining it and measuring its attainment than existing forms 
of water quality criteria do alone. 
States use several forms of water quality criteria to measure use 
attainment in water bodies. Narrative water quality criteria like “no 
toxics in toxic amounts” establish vague, tort-like standards for water 
body conditions.244 Narrative criteria have the advantage of flexibility 
240. See Robert W. Adler, Filling the Gaps in Water Quality Standards: Legal Perspectives on 
Biocriteria, in BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT AND CRITERIA, TOOLS FOR WATER RESOURCE PLANNING 
AND DECISION MAKING 345, 358 (Wayne S. Davis & Thomas P. Simon eds., 1995); Robert W. 
Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive Objectives of Physical and 
Biological Integrity, 33 ENVTL. L. 29, 70–75 (2003).  
241. See Steven F. Hayward, 2011 ALMANAC OF ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS, at x, 129, 131–32 
(2011) (bemoaning the lack of consistent, reliable data on water quality and other environmental 
trends in the United States); V. Kerry Smith & Carlos Valcarcel Wolloh, Has Surface Water Quality 
Improved Since the Clean Water Act? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18,192, 
2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18192 (concluding that water quality has not 
changed markedly since the CWA was passed, but that insufficient monitoring systems and data are 
available to draw firm conclusions).  
242. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (2012). Depending on some semantics 
of definition, an anti-degradation program can also be considered a component of a state’s water 
quality standards. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12.  
243. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).  
244. See EPA, EPA-823-B-94-005a ,WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, 3-2, 3-24 to 3-
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because they are not bound by particular numeric limits. For example, a 
state might prove that the combination of toxic pollutants in a water 
body cause harm even if numeric criteria for individual contaminants are 
met. Narrative criteria beg the question on issues such as “how toxic is 
toxic,” however, and therefore require the kinds of difficult evidence 
typically required of tort-like standards. That limitation is particularly 
important in implementing the CWA’s process for identifying and 
developing remedial action plans for impaired water bodies under CWA 
section 303(d) (TMDLs). That is true particularly because states 
arguably have a disincentive to list more impaired waters because of 
both the additional workload it generates, and the stigma of having a 
higher percentage of water body impairment. 
To address this inherent uncertainty in narrative water quality criteria, 
states also employ numeric criteria that establish precise, measurable, 
and enforceable benchmarks of water quality.245 The advantage of 
numeric criteria is that they articulate a bright line for identifying water 
body impairment and the resulting listing of waters in the TMDL 
process. The disadvantages, however, cut in the direction of both 
potential under- and over-inclusiveness. Numeric criteria alone might 
under-identify impaired waters because they address the effects of only 
one pollutant at time. They might over-identify impaired waters because 
a moderate exceedance of a single numeric criterion might not cause any 
real harm, depending on other factors. 
To address the potential issue of under-inclusiveness, states also use 
whole effluent toxicity (WET) criteria, which are methods to address the 
cumulative and synergistic impacts of multiple pollutants in a water 
body.246 In theory, the WET process can be used to assess the toxicity of 
discharges from individual facilities,247 but also to measure toxicity in a 
water body itself as a result of aggregate sources of pollution.248 Because 
26 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK], available at 
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/handbook/index.cfm.  
245. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(b)(1); WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 244, at 
3-24. In the 1987 CWA amendments, Congress required states to adopt numeric water quality 
criteria for all toxic pollutants that could “reasonably be expected to interfere with” designated uses 
in the state. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 308(d), 101 Stat. 7, 39 (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(B)).  
246. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 189–91 (D.C. Cir. 1988); WATER 
QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 244, at 3-26.  
247. See Natural Res. Def. Council, 859 F.2d 156; Adler, supra note 240, at 350–51, 356–58 
(discussing use of whole effluent toxicity for both individual permits and in assessing water body 
conditions). 
248. See Adler, supra note 240, at 354–55. 
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conditions in a particular water body can change so frequently, however, 
a WET sample can only measure a snapshot of water quality toxicity. 
With the possible exception of WET criteria, these forms of water 
quality criteria are inherently generic in nature, and are developed first 
by EPA on a national scale pursuant to CWA section 304(a).249 By rule, 
EPA encourages states to adopt those criteria or to modify those criteria 
to suit their own conditions, but typically on a statewide basis.250 
Therefore, they do not establish water body-specific goals and 
requirements. Second, none of those forms of water quality criteria, even 
when taken together, address the full aspiration of the CWA to restore 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters. 
That requires a more holistic assessment of overall aquatic ecosystem 
health.251 
To address this gap in our ability to measure attainment of the CWA’s 
overriding goal in a more functional and comprehensive manner, aquatic 
ecologists began to develop biocriteria beginning in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s.252 Biocriteria use protocols designed to assess the relative 
structural and functional integrity of an aquatic ecosystem by 
statistically characterizing the degree of difference between the system 
being assessed and the characteristics of a relatively unimpaired system, 
known as reference water body.253 An increasing number of states, 
interstate water quality agencies, and tribes are using biocriteria to better 
define and determine whether the aspirations of the CWA are being 
met.254 EPA explained in summary how biological methods can be used 
249. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a); see also WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 244, 
app. I (listing EPA’s Water Quality Criteria Documents for various pollutants).  
250. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(b) (authorizing states to adopt EPA’s recommended water quality 
criteria or to adopt more specific criteria where justified scientifically). 
251. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 717 (1994) 
(noting that “water quality requirements generally sufficient to protect designated uses” cannot 
always measure water body impairment in specific water bodies).  
252. See James R. Karr, Assessment of Biotic Integrity Using Fish Communities, FISHERIES, 
Nov.–Dec. 1981, at 21; James R. Karr & Daniel R. Dudley, Ecological Perspective on Water 
Quality Goals, 5 ENVTL. MGMT. 55 (1981). For an early history of biocriteria development, see 
Wayne S. Davis, Biological Assessment and Criteria: Building on the Past, in BIOLOGICAL 
ASSESSMENT AND CRITERIA, TOOLS FOR WATER RESOURCE PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING, 
supra note 240, at 15.  
253. More precisely, biocriteria “are numeric values or narrative expressions that describe the 
reference biological integrity of aquatic communities inhabiting waters that have been given a 
designated aquatic life use.” EPA, EPA-440/5-91-003, BIOLOGICAL CRITERIA: STATE 
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS, at v (1991). 
254. See EPA, EPA-822-F-03-005, STATES AND TRIBES EMBRACE BIOASSESSMENT AND 
BIOCRITERIA FOR PROTECTING STREAMS AND SMALL RIVERS (2003); EPA, SUMMARY OF 
BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAMS AND BIOCRITERIA DEVELOPMENT FOR STATES, TRIBES, 
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to assess the biological integrity of aquatic ecosystems: 
Biological assessments can be used to directly measure the 
overall biological integrity of an aquatic community and the 
synergistic effects of stressors on the aquatic biota residing in a 
waterbody where there are well-developed biological assessment 
programs . . . . This increases the likelihood of detecting the 
effects of episodic events (e.g., spills, dumping, treatment plant 
malfunctions), toxic nonpoint source (NPS) pollution (e.g. 
agricultural pesticides), cumulative pollution (i.e., multiple 
impacts over time or continuous low-level stress), nontoxic 
mechanisms of impact (e.g. trophic structure changes due to 
nutrient enrichment), or other impacts that periodic sampling 
might not detect.255 
Biocriteria thus serve as more precise and more holistic benchmarks 
for aquatic ecosystem health because they assess the degree to which 
those systems have the ecological structure and functions that 
characterize biological integrity. Unlike other forms of water quality 
criteria, which describe what is bad, or those characteristics of water 
bodies we want to avoid, they describe more precisely and scientifically 
the characteristics of ecosystem health we aspire to achieve. 
2. Hydro-Geomorphic Method of Wetland Assessment 
The second example of a more aspirational approach to assessing 
aquatic ecosystem health that embodies a very similar idea is the 
“hydrogeomorphic method” (HGM) of wetlands assessment.256 The 
HGM does the same thing for real-world wetlands functions and values 
as biocriteria do for rivers and other flowing water bodies, by comparing 
the values and functions provided by reference wetlands of the same or 
similar types to those in a wetland sought to be protected or restored.257 
The HGM process addresses common problems with implementation 
of the CWA section 404 permitting program. When the U.S. Army 
TERRITORIES, AND INTERSTATE COMMISSIONS: STREAMS AND WADEABLE RIVERS 1–2 (2002).  
255. EPA, A PRIMER ON USING BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS TO SUPPORT WATER QUALITY 
MANAGEMENT 1 (2011).  
256. See The National Action Plan to Implement the Hydrogeomorphic Approach to Assessing 
Wetland Functions, 62 Fed. Reg. 33,607 (June 20, 1997); MARK M. BRINSON, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF 
ENG’RS, A HYDROGEOMORPHIC CLASSIFICATION FOR WETLANDS (1993); R. DANIEL SMITH ET AL., 
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, AN APPROACH FOR ASSESSING WETLAND FUNCTIONS USING 
HYDROGEOMORPHIC CLASSIFICATION, REFERENCE WETLANDS, AND FUNCTIONAL INDICES (1995).  
257. See The National Action Plan to Implement the Hydrogeomorphic Approach to Assessing 
Wetland Functions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 33,609.  
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Corps of Engineers grants a permit to fill wetlands, in theory the 
developer must provide compensatory mitigation to more than offset the 
harm by restoring or enhancing degraded wetlands elsewhere, or by 
creating artificial wetlands.258 Absent that requirement, permits issued 
under section 404 allowing dischargers to fill entire water bodies—as 
distinct to section 402 permits allowing more limited pollutant 
releases—could not possibly meet the ultimate statutory goal. 
For much of the history of the section 404 program, however, 
compensatory mitigation has been demonstrably inadequate to replace 
the lost ecological, hydrological, and other values and functions once 
provided by filled wetlands.259 Until recently, the Corps has measured 
the sufficiency of compensatory mitigation through the simple calculus 
of counting acres. Permits allowed destruction of X acres of natural 
wetlands in return for compensatory mitigation on Y acres of restored or 
created ones, and so long as Y is greater than X, the permit was 
approved. Little effort was even taken to confirm that the compensatory 
mitigation had successfully been achieved after the initial fill was 
allowed, by which time it is too late to recover the lost benefits from the 
filled wetland. 
Compensatory mitigation policy has improved, at least in concept, 
under revised regulations adopted by EPA and the Corps of Engineers in 
response to additional Congressional direction.260 Wetland mitigation 
arguably has improved as well through the use of wetland mitigation 
banks in which mitigation credits cannot be made available for new 
permits until creation or restoration of wetland values and functions is 
successfully demonstrated.261 
Successful implementation of a compensatory mitigation program, for 
wetlands or any other ecosystem, requires the ability to answer the 
fundamental question of “what was really lost and what was really 
gained in return?” How much wildlife habitat was lost, and of what 
type? How much nutrient-filtering capacity was lost? How much flood-
retention potential was lost? 
The HGM is designed to measure those real-world wetlands values 
and functions through a process quite similar to that used in establishing 
biocriteria. Because there are so many different types of wetlands, and 
258. See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text (describing compensatory mitigation 
requirements for section 404 permits); 40 C.F.R. pt. 230, subpt. J (2012).  
259. See COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES, supra note 195, at 113–22.  
260. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.  
261. See Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking, and 
Takings, 81 IOWA L. REV. 527 (1996). 
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because wetlands vary significantly in the specific values and functions 
they provide,262 ensuring compensatory mitigation cannot be as simple 
as counting acres. A diverse natural mosaic of wetland habitat will 
provide far more biodiversity benefits than a similar amount of 
homogenous, artificially created wetlands. A relatively narrow linear 
system of riparian wetlands provides more flood-control benefits than a 
single large pond. To account for those variables, the HGM classifies 
wetlands by type, and delineates and quantifies the values and functions 
they each provide. This process thereby generates a system of metrics 
through which the values and functions provided by restored or created 
wetlands can be measured and compared to the values and functions lost 
through the permitted fill.263 
Like biocriteria, therefore, the HGM provides a more water body-
specific method of analyzing whether the fundamental aspirations of the 
CWA are achieved in the section 404 program. However, as with 
biocriteria, analysis suggests that HGM is not being adopted rapidly in 
the field,264 and that the process does not measure all wetland values and 
functions adequately absent more intensive data.265 As such, HGM may 
still have untapped potential in improving the extent to which wetland 
values and functions are protected or restored under the section 404 
program. 
3. Desired Future Conditions for Watersheds 
The third example of metrics designed to define more precisely the 
CWA aspirations with respect to individual water bodies is a little more 
vague and variable, and comes from the world of watershed restoration 
and management. Although the watershed restoration and management 
concept itself is inherently diverse and has been received with varying 
262. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 256, at 11.  
263. See The National Action Plan to Implement the Hydrogeomorphic Approach to Assessing 
Wetland Functions, 62 Fed. Reg. 33,607, 33,609–10 (June 20, 1997); SMITH ET AL., supra note 256, 
at 1–5. 
264. See Charles Andrew Cole & James G. Kooser, HGM: Hidden, Gone, Missing?, WETLAND 
SCI. & PRAC., June 2003, at 9; Jon Kusler, Recommendations for Reconciling Wetland Assessment 
Techniques, ASSOCIATION OF STATE WETLAND MANAGERS (Apr. 2006), 
http://www.aswm.org/pdf_lib/reconciling.pdf (finding problems with HGM implementation). 
265. See Thomas Hruby, Testing the Basic Assumption of the Hydrogeomorphic Approach to 
Assessing Wetland Functions, 27 ENVTL. MGMT. 749 (2001) (questioning assumption that modified 
wetlands provide fewer values and functions than unimpaired wetlands); Emilie K. Stander & Joan 
G. Ehrenfeld, Rapid Assessment of Urban Wetlands: Do Hydrogeomorphic Classification and 
Reference Criteria Work?, 43 ENVTL. MGMT. 725 (2009) (finding problems with HGM assessment 
of nitrogen cycling). 
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levels of favor,266 one common characteristic of watershed management 
is a collaborative effort to identify the “desired future conditions” of a 
water body.267 A desired future condition, of course, can be just as vague 
as “no toxics in toxic amounts.” When applied most effectively, 
however, a statement of desired future conditions identifies watershed 
restoration and protection goals much more precisely, and in a manner 
appropriate to the particular system at issue. 
Although the Chesapeake Bay Program has had significant 
implementation and attainment issues in its long history,268 it is a good 
example of a collaborative effort to establish specific, measurable 
watershed restoration targets. Rather than simply defining regulatory 
standards of conduct or pollution reduction targets, the program defines 
more functional ecosystem restoration goals:269 How many acres of 
submerged aquatic vegetation are necessary to support healthy 
populations of waterfowl? What population of blue crabs is necessary 
for a sustainable population and healthy economy?270 Those measures 
266. See Robert W. Adler & Michele Straube, Watersheds and the Integration of U.S. Water Law 
and Policy: Bridging the Great Divides, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2000); Jon 
Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 379 (2000); A. Dan Tarlock, Putting Rivers Back in the Landscape: The Revival of Watershed 
Management in the United States, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1059 (2008); 
Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in 
Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239 (2008).  
267. A “desired future condition” refers to the “social, economic, and ecological attributes” 
expected from adoption of a particular resource management regime, and derives from federal 
ecosystem management policy. See Robert E. Bennetts & Bruce B. Bingham, Comparing Current 
and Desired Conditions of Resource Values for Evaluating Management Performance: A 
Cautionary Note on an Otherwise Useful Concept, 24 GEORGE WRIGHT F. 108, 108 (2007).  
268. See Robert W. Adler, Priceline for Pollution: Auctions to Allocate Public Pollution Control 
Dollars, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 745, 796–807 (2010) (providing history and 
status of Bay cleanup efforts); William L. Andreen et al., White Paper 11-02, Missing the Mark in 
the Chesapeake Bay: A Report Card for the Phase I Watershed Implementation Plans, CENTER FOR 
PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Jan. 2011), http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/ 
ChesBay_WIPs_1102.pdf; State of the Bay 2010, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION (2010), 
http://www.cbf.org/document.doc?id=596 (reporting limited progress in overall Bay restoration 
efforts and failing or near-failing grades in most aspects of the Bay’s water pollution control 
programs).  
269. See EPA, STRENGTHENING THE MANAGEMENT, COORDINATION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF 
THE CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM: REPORT TO CONGRESS (2008); Carl Hershner et al., Assessment 
of Chesapeake Bay Program Selection and Use of Indicators, 4 ECOHEALTH 187, 189 (2007).  
270. These program goals and commitments are formally recognized in an agreement entitled 
Chesapeake 2000, signed on June 28, 2000. Chesapeake 2000, CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, 
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/content/publications/cbp_12081.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2013). 
Specific goals in the agreement include a tenfold increase in native oysters in the Bay relative to a 
1994 baseline; restoring fish passage for migratory to more than 1357 miles of blocked river habitat; 
protecting and restoring 114,000 acres of submerged aquatic vegetation; restoring 25,000 acres of 
wetlands; and reducing nutrient loadings by 40%. Id.  
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are similar to the concept of minimum viable population size common in 
ESA implementation,271 and support the restoration component of the 
CWA aspiration. More important, like both biocriteria and HGM, they 
help to define and provide a more specific set of criteria by which to 
ascertain whether the CWA aspirations are being achieved. 
B. Moving from Aspiration to Attainment 
Articulating more specific goals for individual water bodies has two 
important conceptual advantages. First, it is often easier to achieve 
specific, clearly defined goals than a lofty but vague concept such as 
“physical, chemical, and biological integrity.” Second, principles of 
bioregionalism suggest that individuals and communities are more 
willing to accept costs—including both economic costs and volunteer 
work—designed to restore and maintain special local or regional places 
than to implement generic programs with a huge national price tag and 
less clearly defined benefits to local communities.272 The three examples 
discussed above illustrate this kind of effort and how it can operate 
within, rather than replace, the existing construct of the CWA. These 
programs all require more time and effort to more precisely define what 
the generic aspirations in the CWA actually mean for individual water 
bodies and watersheds, but have the potential to cost-effectively improve 
the degree to which those aspirations are actually attained. 
Defining CWA aspirations more precisely for individual water 
bodies, however, absent implementing actions in the real world, does not 
ensure that those aspirations will be attained. So why might these ideas 
be helpful in renewing the spirit of aspiration in the CWA? I am not 
suggesting that these methodologies, individually or collectively, 
constitute the “silver bullet” that will generate full attainment of the 
CWA aspirations absent other reforms. There are at least three reasons to 
believe, however, that re-defining aspirations in this way can at least 
generate some progress toward than end. 
First, particularly given the increasingly prevalent anti-regulatory 
sentiment in the United States, perhaps fueled in part by the “societal 
271. See Notice of Availability of Recovery Goals for Four Endangered Fishes of the Colorado 
River Basin, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,270 (Aug. 28, 2002); Mark Shaffer, Minimum Viable Population 
Goals: Coping with Uncertainty, in VIABLE POPULATIONS FOR CONSERVATION 69 (Michael E. 
Soulé ed., 1987).  
272. See Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973, 
1000–03 (1994) (describing place-based incentives for watershed protection). See generally 
BIOREGIONALISM (Michael McGinnis ed., 1998).  
 
                                                     
04 - Adler Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2013  10:49 AM 
2013] ASPIRATION IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT 811 
amnesia” discussed earlier,273 it is possible that the individuals and 
organizations responsible for CWA implementation will respond better 
to affirmative goals than to prohibitions. Each of the ecosystem 
restoration and protection measures described above is stated in 
affirmative rather than negative terms. The first time I wrote about 
biocriteria in a book chapter published 1995, I described them in this 
regard as “aims to achieve, not ills to avoid.”274 
As explained earlier, the CWA is an aspirational statute, but most of 
the actual implementation mechanisms are “ills to avoid” rather than 
“aims to achieve.” Section 301(a) prohibits any discharge of a pollutant 
absent a permit that implements various substantive requirements.275 No 
such permit may be issued absent the imposition of effluent limitations 
governing the allowable discharges.276 Any violation of those permit 
limitations can generate administrative, civil, or criminal penalties.277 As 
a result, there is a significant disconnect between the aspirational goals 
and the prohibitive implementation tools. 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that we abandon any of those 
essential regulatory or enforcement tools for the most fundamental 
operative requirements of the CWA. If we did, we would almost 
certainly backslide from the past progress we have made in CWA 
implementation to date. Perhaps the chief lesson from the past forty 
years, however, is that to move beyond that existing progress we need to 
inspire people that there are affirmative aims to achieve. With the hope 
that this does not seem like a trivial analogy, my strong impression is 
that there is far less littering today than when I grew up, and certainly 
less than in many parts of world. Did we succeed in reducing littering by 
imposing hefty fines, or because of the “Keep America Beautiful” 
campaign278 that captured public imagination? 
A second and related reason why the above means of redefining the 
aspirations in the CWA might also help to promote better attainment is 
that people and communities respond better when they have a role in 
defining the aims to achieve. That is particularly true for place-based 
watershed programs that assemble diverse group of community 
participants to define the “desired future conditions” of the watershed. In 
273. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.  
274. Adler, supra note 240, at 346.  
275. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006) (prohibiting any discharge absent compliance with §§ 302, 306, 
and 307, and pursuant to permits issued under either § 402 or § 404). 
276. Id. §§ 1311(b), 1342.  
277. Id. § 1319.  
278. KEEP AMERICA BEAUTIFUL, http://www.kab.org (last visited Aug. 11, 2013). 
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rural watersheds, maybe farmers will be more willing to achieve an 
affirmative result than to stop doing something because EPA said so. In 
urban watersheds, maybe individuals will be more willing to volunteer 
in local stream restoration projects if they understand exactly what flood 
control, aesthetic, and ecosystem benefits they will enjoy, and once they 
support those efforts will be less opposed to increased sewerage and 
storm water collection and treatment fees to protect their personal 
investments in the health of their local waterways. 
Third, perhaps by more clearly defining the aims to achieve in CWA 
implementation, we can transcend the philosophy of “we have done the 
best we can,” which is fairly pervasive in the “best technology” aspects 
of the CWA.279 Although best-technology principles arguably are 
responsible for much of the progress we have made in achieving the 
CWA’s aspirations, the converse argument is that once we have done the 
best we can, what else is there? Perhaps more specific, affirmative 
statements of water body-specific aspirations will induce more 
innovation than is traditionally inherent in best technology requirements, 
which some scholars have argued actually provide a disincentive for 
innovation because once developed, they must be adopted across the 
board.280 
CONCLUSION 
Four decades after Congress set forth ambitious aspirations for the 
nation’s waters, we have made significant progress in some aspects of 
water pollution control, but far less in others. More important, progress 
seems to have peaked a decade or two after statutory enactment and then 
reached a plateau in many respects. This Article explored possible 
reasons for that stagnation, and potential new strategies to try to 
reinvigorate the statutory aspirations. If we renew our attention to the 
fundamental aspirations of the CWA and try to define what they mean 
more precisely and more pragmatically, they may help us to do what is 
required. 
279. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.  
280. See supra note 173. My point here is not to take sides in this longstanding debate, although 
historically I have advocated continued and improved implementation of best technology principles, 
and even expanding them to nonpoint source pollution control efforts. See Robert W. Adler, Water 
Quality and Agriculture: Assessing Alternative Futures, 25 ENVIRONS 77 (2002).  
 
                                                     
